Mox v. Olson

Background

Minnesota’s Private Career School Act requires covered private vocational schools to obtain a license from the Minnesota Office of Higher Education. The Act imposes requirements including licensing fees, financial disclosures, advertising submissions, inspections, a surety bond, and permanent student records.

Leda Mox founded Armstrong Equine Massage Therapy, LLC, and is its sole instructor. Armstrong offers four equine-massage courses. Two are one-day introductory classes, and two are four-day certification classes. The certification courses include testing, work on horses, massages, case studies, and instruction about marketing and client records.

Mox alleged that Minnesota authorities told her in March 2023 that she could no longer teach horse massage without a license. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act covered Armstrong because it offered vocational courses and granted certificates, and that they were not exempt. They also alleged that complying with the Act would be expensive and burdensome and could threaten Mox’s business.

The plaintiffs brought a single-count challenge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought an injunction against enforcement, declarations that the Act was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to them, and a declaration that Armstrong could continue teaching.

Motion to dismiss

Dennis Olson, Jr., sued in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Office of Higher Education, moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). That rule allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. At this stage, the court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiffs.

The court considered the Office of Higher Education’s letter because the complaint incorporated it. The court did not consider a declaration, voicemail, and emails submitted by the Commissioner because they did not fall within the materials that may ordinarily be considered on a motion to dismiss.

Coverage under the Act

The court found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Act covered Armstrong. The Act defines a private career school to include a person that conducts a program below the associate-degree level, unless an exemption applies. The court reasoned that Mox and Armstrong qualified as “persons,” and that Armstrong’s courses qualified as programs because they were listed on its website and two provided formal recognition through certification.

The court also concluded that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that no exemption applied. The court noted that Armstrong’s four-day certification classes appeared to exceed the Act’s sixteen-hour threshold and that the website listed a certification-class price of $1,695. The court stated that the Private and Out-of-State Public Postsecondary Education Act appeared inapplicable because it concerned institutions granting degrees, while the plaintiffs granted certificates rather than degrees.

First Amendment allegations

The court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Act regulated speech. Relying in part on a Ninth Circuit decision involving a horseshoeing school, the court explained that vocational instruction can communicate specialized knowledge and teach specific skills protected by the First Amendment.

The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the Act regulated only non-expressive conduct, such as charging tuition or advertising courses. Looking at the Act as a whole, the court found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that its practical effect was to stop private career schools from teaching unless they complied with the licensing requirements.

The court further found that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Act was content-based. The Act exempts or treats favorably certain instruction, including purely avocational or recreational subjects, fine arts, personal development, modeling, acting, certain test-preparation programs, religious schools, and programs offered by certain organizations for their members. Because these distinctions depend on the subject matter of instruction or the identity of the speaker, the court concluded that the Act engages in content-based discrimination.

Why the motion was denied

Content-based speech restrictions generally receive strict scrutiny, while some other speech burdens receive intermediate scrutiny. Under either standard, the court determined that it could not decide at the motion-to-dismiss stage whether the Act was sufficiently tailored to the government’s interests. The Commissioner identified interests related to protecting students and ensuring the legitimacy of educational programs, but the court found that the Commissioner had not provided an adequate record showing that the Act advanced those interests without burdening substantially more speech than necessary.

Disposition

The court denied Dennis Olson, Jr.’s motion to dismiss. The ruling allowed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to proceed, but it did not decide whether the Private Career School Act is constitutional.