Haidari v. Mayorkas

Background

Bilal Haidari alleged that federal agents repeatedly detained him during domestic and international air travel. He described secondary screening, delays lasting from about 40 minutes to several hours, intrusive searches, and seizures of his phone. He alleged that these incidents caused him to miss flights and work-related calls and required him to change his travel plans.

Haidari alleged that he was repeatedly assigned the “Secondary Security Screening Selection” designation, known as “SSSS,” and that this designation caused enhanced screening. He said he had contacted the Department of Homeland Security through its traveler-redress program but never received an explanation for the screening. He sued Alejandro Mayorkas, Chris Magnus, and Christopher Wray, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, expungement of screening records, and attorney’s fees; he did not seek damages.

Haidari asserted claims under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and free-speech protections; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; and the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection guarantee. He also alleged that Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border Protection officials retaliated against him for filing an earlier lawsuit concerning the processing of his permanent-residency application.

Rule 12(b)(6) standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not plead enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but held that conclusory assertions were not enough.

Analysis

The court first addressed allegations that the defendants had a policy or practice of targeting Muslims. It held that Haidari’s allegations concerned only his own experiences and did not plausibly establish a broader policy. The court also found no factual connection between his Muslim faith and the SSSS designations or enhanced screenings. The complaint did not allege, for example, what occurred during the screenings that suggested religious targeting, how often Muslim travelers received such designations, or how Muslims were treated compared with other religious groups.

The court found that the Establishment Clause claim was atypical and appeared to fit better under the Free Exercise Clause. The complaint did not allege that the defendants tried to benefit a religion or endorse particular religious beliefs. The court also noted that the complaint lacked the detailed allegations present in another case involving Muslim travelers who were questioned about their religious beliefs, practices, and associations at the border.

The court dismissed the Free Exercise and Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims because Haidari did not allege that the screening burdens interfered with his religious exercise. Although he alleged delays, lengthy inspections, and changes to his travel plans, he did not allege that he was prevented from praying, worshiping, or engaging in another religious practice, or that the screening compelled conduct inconsistent with his faith. Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a claimant must allege a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion by the federal government.

The court found the equal-protection allegations conclusory. Haidari alleged that the defendants discriminated against Muslims and treated travelers of other religions differently, but he did not plead facts supporting a plausible inference of discriminatory purpose or disparate treatment.

The court also dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim. Haidari alleged that the defendants “appear to have” retaliated against him for filing a 2006 lawsuit, but he offered no facts plausibly connecting that lawsuit to the later travel delays, questioning, searches, and seizures. The court described the retaliation theory as speculative.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Haidari’s complaint without prejudice. It allowed him to file an amended complaint within 30 days, on or before September 25, 2023. The order states that if no amended complaint is filed by that deadline, judgment will be entered dismissing the original complaint with prejudice and on the merits.