Cham v. Mayo Clinic

Background

Abulla Cham, a former Mayo security officer, alleged that Mayo denied him appointments to interim supervisory positions, investigated him, and terminated his employment because of his race and his complaints about race discrimination. His six claims were: race discrimination under Title VII, race discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, reprisal under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, retaliation under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, and common-law fraud and misrepresentation.

Mayo argued that it did not select Cham for the interim positions because Michael Lee had substantially more Mayo and supervisory experience, while Chelsey Scheevel had relevant law-enforcement experience and a prior working relationship with Lee. Mayo stated that it terminated Cham after investigating a November 27, 2021 confrontation involving a Rochester resident and concluding that Cham had violated Mayo policies.

Race-discrimination claims

The court analyzed the failure-to-promote and termination claims under the applicable standards for Title VII, the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and Section 1981. For the Title VII and Minnesota Human Rights Act claims, Cham had to show that Mayo’s stated, nondiscriminatory reasons were a pretext—a cover for unlawful discrimination. For the Section 1981 claims, Cham had to show that race was the but-for cause of the alleged injury.

For the interim supervisor position, the court found that Lee had substantially greater experience as a Mayo security officer and assistant supervisor, while Cham had no prior supervisory experience. For the interim assistant supervisor position, the court found that Cham and Scheevel had qualifications that were more evenly matched. The court held that Mayo could choose between similarly qualified employees and that Cham had not identified evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mayo’s reasons were pretextual. The court also held that a manager’s preference for employees with whom the manager had a prior working relationship was not, by itself, unlawful race discrimination.

Regarding termination, the court found that Mayo had offered a legitimate reason based on its investigation and conclusion that Cham had harassed a member of the public and violated Mayo policies. Cham argued that Mayo deviated from its investigation practices and treated a white security officer, identified as CS, more favorably. The court found no evidence of a firm Mayo investigation policy from which Mayo had deviated. It also found that CS was not similarly situated because CS was disciplined for failing to intervene during a Rochester police officer’s restraint of a patient, while Cham was accused of directly harassing a member of the public. The court concluded that Cham had not shown a genuine factual dispute over whether Mayo’s reasons for denying the promotions or terminating him were pretextual, and it also found that he had not shown that race was the but-for cause under Section 1981.

Remaining state-law claims and disposition

After granting summary judgment on Counts 1, 2, and 4, only state-law claims remained. Under the supplemental-jurisdiction statute, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over those claims.

The court ordered that Mayo’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED as to Counts 1, 2, and 4. It ordered that Counts 3, 5, and 6 be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.