Minnesota Deer Farmers Association v. State of Minnesota, The

Background

The Minnesota Legislature enacted legislation intended to combat Chronic Wasting Disease, an incurable and fatal disease affecting white-tailed deer and other members of the Cervidae family. The legislation increased regulation of farmed Cervidae, required additional fencing to limit contact with wild deer, restricted transfers of white-tailed deer-farm registrations, and prohibited new white-tailed deer-farm registrations.

The Minnesota Deer Farmers Association and individual deer farmers sued Sarah Strommen, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, and several Minnesota Board of Animal Health members in their official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged that Minnesota Statute § 35.155 violated substantive and procedural due process, equal protection, and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. They also sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of § 35.155, subdivision 10(c), and the additional fencing requirements.

Motion to Dismiss

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief.

Substantive Due Process

The plaintiffs argued that the law violated a fundamental right to pursue the occupation of white-tailed deer farming. The court held that the ability to work in a chosen occupation is not a fundamental right requiring the highest level of constitutional review. The court therefore applied rational-basis review, which asks whether the law is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.

The court held that preventing the spread of Chronic Wasting Disease is a legitimate state interest and that prohibiting new white-tailed deer farms could rationally further that interest. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count II.

Equal Protection

The plaintiffs challenged the law’s limitation of a registration transfer to one immediate family member and its application to farmed Cervidae rather than other livestock and poultry. The court held that these classifications did not involve a fundamental right or a suspect classification and therefore applied rational-basis review.

The court concluded that allowing one transfer to an immediate family member could rationally limit the number of white-tailed deer farms while allowing another generation of farming families to continue. It also held that white-tailed deer farmers were not similarly situated to poultry and other livestock farmers because Chronic Wasting Disease affects Cervidae, not those other animals in the same way. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Counts I and III.

Takings Clause

The plaintiffs argued that provisions allowing the seizure and destruction of illegally possessed Cervidae, restricting registration transfers, authorizing destruction of herds where Chronic Wasting Disease was detected, and requiring fencing amounted to a taking of property. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief rather than money damages.

The court held that prospective injunctive and declaratory relief was generally unavailable for the asserted Takings Clause claims because Minnesota provides an inverse-condemnation procedure for seeking compensation. The plaintiffs had not alleged that a taking without compensation had already occurred and did not show that Minnesota’s compensation procedure was inadequate.

The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the regulatory scheme itself was a regulatory taking under the three-factor test concerning economic impact, interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. The court determined that the fencing expense alone was insufficient, the regulations did not prevent the farmers from continuing to operate their businesses, and the fencing requirements advanced public health and safety. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the Takings Clause claim.

Procedural Due Process

The plaintiffs argued that the Department of Natural Resources imposed additional fencing requirements without required rulemaking or public comment. The court found that the department’s website did not impose new requirements. Instead, it referred to the statutory requirements and gave examples of fencing that would comply. The website also stated that it was informational and did not have the force of law. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead a due process violation and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count IV.

Preliminary Injunction and Disposition

Because the court dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety, it denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.

The order granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice, and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.