Jama v. Peters
- Jeffrey Bryan
- 0:23-cv-03075
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 14
In Jama v. Peters, Judge Bryan denied the official-capacity dismissal motion but granted the individual-capacity dismissal motion in a Religious Freedom Restoration Act case.
Muna Jama’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims against the Bureau of Prisons officials in their official and individual capacities; the official-capacity claims remained pending, while the individual-capacity defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted.
What happened
Muna Jama, a practicing Muslim incarcerated at FCI Waseca, alleged that prison officials required photographs showing her without her hijab and used those photographs for identification and other prison activities. She sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
The official-capacity defendants argued that Jama’s request for an order stopping those practices was moot because the prison adopted a dual-photograph process and gave her a covered-photo identification card. The court rejected that argument because the new process could change, an earlier waiver had not prevented the conduct from recurring, and the prison still retained uncovered photographs. The individual-capacity defendants argued that qualified immunity protected them; the court agreed because Jama did not identify a clearly established right that gave officials fair warning their conduct violated the Act.
In Jama v. Peters, Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan denied the official-capacity defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the individual-capacity defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court did not decide whether the alleged conduct violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because qualified immunity resolved the individual-capacity claims.
The detailed version
- Jama v. Peters · No. 0:23-cv-03075
- Jeffrey M. Bryan
- Oct. 7, 2024
Background
Muna Jama alleged that she is a practicing Muslim incarcerated at FCI Waseca and that wearing a hijab is part of her religious practice. She alleged that, in 2019, an officer required her to have a booking photograph taken without her hijab and threatened solitary confinement if she did not cooperate. The photograph was used on her prison identification card and was displayed or accessible during activities including identification checks, bed counts, commissary transactions, and programming.
After Jama complained, officers took another photograph without her hijab, allegedly threatening placement in a special housing unit if she did not cooperate. Jama alleged that the uncovered photograph continued to appear on her identification card, prison systems, a bed-count book, and her locker, and that administrators viewed it. She filed this action under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which generally prohibits the government from substantially burdening religious exercise unless the burden satisfies specified governmental-interest and least-restrictive-means requirements.
While the case was pending, the prison adopted a dual-photograph process. A photograph showing Jama wearing her hijab would be used for her identification card and everyday prison business. A second photograph without her hijab would be taken by a female officer, kept with highly restricted access, and viewed only in the event of Jama’s escape. The process was subject to annual review. The parties also entered a temporary stipulation under which the prison agreed, absent exigent circumstances, to use the covered photograph and allow Jama to use a new identification card featuring it during the case.
Official-Capacity Defendants
The officials sued in their official capacities moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that Jama’s request for injunctive relief was moot because the prison had voluntarily stopped the challenged practices.
The court explained that voluntary cessation makes a case moot only when the defendant shows that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur. The court found that the defendants had not met that burden for three reasons:
- They did not explain why the new dual-photograph waiver was more reliable than the earlier waiver, which had not prevented the challenged conduct from recurring.
- The new waiver could change or expire after annual review, and the record did not explain what conditions would control that review.
- The prison continued to retain images of Jama without her hijab, while her requested relief included destruction of existing photographs and security-camera footage.
The court therefore concluded that the case was not moot and denied the Official Capacity Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court expressly declined at that stage to decide the defendants’ arguments about whether retaining the restricted photograph violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or whether nationwide injunctive relief was appropriate, stating that those arguments concerned the merits rather than justiciability.
Individual-Capacity Defendants
The individual-capacity defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a claim for relief. They argued that qualified immunity protected them. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from individual-capacity liability when the plaintiff has not shown a violation of a right that was clearly established at the time.
The court began with the clearly-established-right requirement. It held that Jama had not identified binding authority that would have fairly warned the defendants that enforcing the generally applicable identification policy violated her rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court cited decisions addressing religious headwear and similar prison policies, including a decision concluding that there was no clearly established right to wear a hijab for a booking photograph.
The court concluded that removing Jama’s hijab for booking photographs and identification did not violate a clearly established religious right. It therefore held that the individual-capacity defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and granted their motion to dismiss. Because the court found the clearly-established-right requirement unsatisfied, it did not decide whether Jama had plausibly alleged a violation of a statutory right.
Disposition
The order states:
- The Official Capacity Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. No. 58, is DENIED. - The Individual Capacity Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. No. 53, is GRANTED.
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan signed the order on October 7, 2024.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.