Halloran v. United States

Background

Daniel J. Halloran filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The opinion also identifies the related criminal matter as No. 13-CR-297 (KMK). Halloran had been convicted after trial of five counts involving two bribery schemes: a scheme involving New York City Council discretionary funds and a scheme involving efforts to obtain a Republican Party authorization for Malcom Smith to seek the Republican nomination for New York City mayor. The convictions included Travel Act bribery, wire fraud, honest-services wire fraud, and conspiracy. The court sentenced Halloran to 120 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied review.

Halloran also filed a motion under Rule 6 of the rules governing Section 2255 proceedings seeking documents and records from the Government and third parties. The court stated that both the petition and the discovery motion were before it.

McDonnell Claim

Halloran argued that McDonnell v. United States required his convictions to be overturned or a new trial because the evidence was insufficient and the jury instructions improperly defined “official act.” McDonnell held that an official act must involve a specific and focused matter involving a formal exercise of governmental power, and that merely arranging a meeting, speaking with another official, or organizing an event is not enough without more.

The court rejected Halloran’s challenges to the first and second counts, which were Travel Act convictions based on New York bribery offenses. The jury instructions tracked the language of the applicable New York statutes, and those statutes did not use the federal “official act” terminology at issue in McDonnell. The court concluded that McDonnell did not disturb those convictions.

The court also rejected Halloran’s challenge to the third count, involving wire fraud in the discretionary-funds scheme. The jury had found him guilty under both an honest-services theory and a money-or-property-fraud theory. Because the money-or-property-fraud theory did not depend on proving an “official act,” the court concluded that the conviction remained valid regardless of McDonnell’s effect on the honest-services theory.

The court likewise rejected the challenge to the fifth count, conspiracy involving the Wilson-Pakula scheme. The jury had been instructed on two possible objects of the conspiracy: honest-services fraud and Travel Act bribery. Because the Travel Act bribery object did not require proof of an “official act” as defined in McDonnell, the court concluded that the conspiracy conviction remained valid.

The court agreed that the jury instructions for the fourth count—honest-services wire fraud involving the Wilson-Pakula scheme—were erroneous under McDonnell. The instructions had defined official acts to include decisions or actions generally expected of an official and acts taken under the color of official authority. The court nevertheless held that the error was harmless. It found that obtaining a Wilson-Pakula authorization involved a specific governmental or official matter and that the evidence showed Halloran sought more than meetings or communications: he sought official action, including votes and pressure on other party committee members. The court concluded that a rational jury would have found Halloran guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under the narrower McDonnell standard.

The court also held, alternatively, that the evidence concerning the discretionary-funds scheme was sufficient under the McDonnell standard. Allocating New York City Council discretionary funds was a specific matter involving a formal exercise of government power. The evidence showed that Halloran agreed to divert public funds in exchange for benefits, and the court stated that it was not legally necessary for him ultimately to carry out the promised allocation.

Brady and Giglio Claim

Halloran claimed that the Government withheld favorable evidence about cooperating witness Moses Stern, including information about Stern’s political activities and relationships. He argued that the evidence would have supported defenses based on entrapment and selective prosecution.

The court held that Halloran had not shown that the Government suppressed any evidence. In the court’s view, his claim depended on several inferences drawn from newspaper articles and did not identify specific documents or records that the Government had withheld. The court also held that Halloran had not shown prejudice. The proposed evidence concerned Stern’s activities involving other people and did not show that Halloran himself had been induced or lacked a predisposition to commit the crimes. The court further concluded that Halloran had not explained how the proposed evidence would have established selective prosecution.

Discovery Motion

The court denied Halloran’s discovery motion. It explained that discovery in a Section 2255 proceeding requires good cause, meaning specific allegations showing reason to believe that developing the facts could establish entitlement to relief. The court found that Halloran’s request rested on speculation, would not affect the verdict even if the evidence existed, and sought information about Stern despite Halloran’s having already received substantial discovery and examined Stern at trial.

Prosecutorial-Misconduct Claim

Halloran argued that recently reported information about Assistant United States Attorney Alvin Bragg’s involvement in decisions concerning Stern and other politicians showed prosecutorial misconduct, particularly selective prosecution. The court rejected the claim because Halloran identified no evidence that the other politician had committed a crime, that Bragg had considered prosecuting him, or that Halloran had been singled out for prosecution. The court held that speculation did not satisfy the demanding standard for selective prosecution.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas dismissed the Section 2255 petition and denied Halloran’s discovery motion. The court entered judgment for the United States, closed the case, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that an appeal from the judgment on the merits would not be taken in good faith.