Ingram v. United States

Background

Sean Ingram, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence. The court’s opinion also identifies a related criminal case, No. 14-CR-760 (KMK).

Ingram pleaded guilty to six charges: conspiring to rob Ryan Ennis; aiding and abetting Ennis’s robbery and murder; two drug-distribution conspiracies; and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. His cooperation agreement stated that the sentence was solely for the court to decide, that the Government would not promise or recommend a specific sentence, and that the written agreement superseded prior understandings unless additional terms were written and signed by all parties.

At his guilty-plea hearing, Ingram confirmed under oath that he understood the court alone would determine his sentence and that no one had promised him a particular sentence. He later gave similar sworn testimony while testifying for the Government at Anthony Grecco’s trial.

The Government moved for a reduced sentence based on Ingram’s substantial assistance. The court granted that motion and considered the sentencing factors, including Ingram’s criminal history, his role in facilitating Ennis’s murder, his conduct after the murder, his cooperation, and the sentence imposed on Andrea Beatty. Although the Guidelines range was 420 months to life imprisonment, the court imposed 96 months. The judgment was entered on January 5, 2017.

Claims

Ingram raised two principal claims. First, he alleged that the Government made a separate promise—apparently involving a 60-month sentence or a promise to advocate for that sentence—and that he pleaded guilty in reliance on it. Second, he argued that his sentence was excessively harsh, amounted to judicial misconduct, and was unfairly different from Beatty’s 36-month sentence.

Analysis

The court rejected the alleged side-agreement claim. It held that Ingram’s unsupported allegations could not overcome his contrary sworn statements during the guilty-plea proceeding and his later testimony. The court also relied on the cooperation agreement’s integration clause, which disclaimed additional promises or understandings outside the written agreement. Because the agreement expressly stated that the Government would not promise or recommend a specific sentence, the court concluded that the alleged side agreement could not support relief. It also concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary on that claim.

The court rejected the sentencing-disparity claim as a matter of law. It explained that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) requires consideration of unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records and similar conduct, but does not require a court to compare a defendant’s sentence with that of a co-defendant. Independently, the court viewed Ingram as more culpable than Beatty because he supplied her drugs, directed her in connection with drug sales, and directed her to drive Grecco to Ossining, New York.

The court also rejected Ingram’s argument that his sentence was too severe given his cooperation. It found that the sentencing court had considered his cooperation along with the other statutory factors and determined that, without his cooperation, a sentence within the 420-month-to-life Guidelines range would have been appropriate. The court stated that cooperation was a major reason it imposed 96 months instead. It found no constitutional error or fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Disposition

The opinion first states that the petition is denied. In its conclusion, the court states that it dismisses Ingram’s petition. The court did not issue a certificate of appealability because Ingram had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied. It also certified that an appeal from the merits judgment would not be taken in good faith and directed the Clerk to terminate the pending motion and mail Ingram a copy of the order.