Saheed v. City Of New York

Background

Hafeez Saheed, who was proceeding without a lawyer when the summary-judgment motion was filed, sued the City of New York, Kevin Kenny, William Nakelski, Ou Wu, and unidentified defendants. The claims arose from a December 12, 2015 vehicle checkpoint at which Saheed was stopped, could not produce a driver’s license, was taken to the 47th Precinct, and received four summonses. The summonses concerned operating without a license, window tint, and possessing an altered driver’s license.

Saheed claimed that Nakelski pulled him from his vehicle and handcuffed him too tightly or with twisted cuffs, causing continuing right-wrist pain. He also claimed that he requested medical attention and that the officers failed to provide it. Nakelski and Wu testified that Saheed exited the vehicle without being touched. The record included ambulance and medical records documenting wrist complaints, an injury noted seventeen days later, x-rays ordered by Saheed’s doctor, and ibuprofen prescribed for continuing pain.

Saheed asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and unlawful imprisonment, denial of a fair trial, malicious prosecution, excessive force, failure to intervene, supervisory liability, and municipal liability. He also asserted New York claims for false arrest, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, negligence-related conduct, and violations of the New York Constitution. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A dispute is genuine when a reasonable jury could decide the issue for the nonmoving party. The court generally must not weigh evidence or decide witness credibility at this stage, and it construed Saheed’s filings liberally because he was unrepresented during the motion practice. The court independently reviewed the record despite Saheed’s failure to comply fully with the local rule governing factual statements.

False arrest and malicious prosecution

The court granted summary judgment on Saheed’s federal and state false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims. It held that the officers had probable cause to arrest Saheed for violating New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509 because he was driving and could not produce a valid license or otherwise show that he was licensed. The court also noted that Saheed had been found guilty of operating without a license at a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing and could not relitigate probable cause for that offense.

The court separately held that the officers had probable cause to issue the criminal summons for possessing an altered license. The license in Saheed’s wallet had black marker across its expiration date, and Saheed acknowledged that he possessed it. The court stated that the offense did not require proof that Saheed intended to use the altered license.

The court also found additional problems with the malicious-prosecution claims. The record did not show that the dismissal of the criminal summons affirmatively indicated Saheed’s innocence, and Saheed had not shown the post-arraignment restraint required for his federal malicious-prosecution claim. The court stated that the officers also had probable cause concerning the window-tint summonses, although those summonses were dismissed.

Denial of a fair trial

The court granted summary judgment on Saheed’s fair-trial claim. A fabrication-of-evidence claim requires proof that an investigating official fabricated evidence likely to influence a jury, sent it to prosecutors, and caused a loss of liberty as a result.

The court concluded that several alleged statements—including statements about alcohol, a seatbelt, Kenny’s shirt, and medical treatment—were not sent to prosecutors or the court. It also found no genuine dispute that Saheed had been stopped at a checkpoint and had not provided his driver’s license. The court found that the alleged statements about the arrest and window tint did not support a fair-trial claim because they either were not forwarded to a prosecutor or were supported by probable cause and the record.

Excessive force, assault, and battery

The court denied summary judgment on Saheed’s federal excessive-force claim and his state assault-and-battery claims against Nakelski. Excessive force during an arrest or stop is evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard. The court considers the seriousness of the offense, the threat posed, whether the person resisted or fled, and the nature of the force and injury.

Applying the Second Circuit’s guidance on handcuffing, the court held that a reasonable jury could find that Nakelski’s handcuffing was unreasonable. Saheed testified that the cuffs were twisted and caused pain, and he claimed that he requested medical attention at the arrest scene and at the precinct. The court also found that the ambulance records, emergency-room records, later medical visit, x-ray referrals, and prescription evidence could support a finding that the injury was more than temporary discomfort.

The court denied Nakelski’s qualified-immunity defense because it concluded that the right to be free from excessive force was clearly established at the time of the arrest. It granted summary judgment to Wu and Kenny on the excessive-force, assault, and battery claims because the record did not contain facts showing that Saheed was injured by force applied by either of them.

Failure to intervene

The court denied summary judgment on Saheed’s § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim against Wu and Kenny to the extent the claim concerned the alleged excessive force. An officer may be liable for failing to intervene when the officer had a realistic opportunity to prevent another officer from violating a constitutional right and did not take reasonable steps to do so.

The court found a genuine factual dispute because Wu and Kenny were present during the arrest, allegedly saw how Nakelski handled Saheed, and did not stop him. Saheed also claimed that he requested medical attention from both Wu and Kenny and that neither responded. The court dismissed the failure-to-intervene claim against Nakelski because an officer cannot be liable for failing to stop himself. It granted summary judgment on any failure-to-intervene theory not based on preventing the alleged excessive force.

Other claims

The court granted summary judgment on Saheed’s supervisory-liability claim because he offered no facts showing that Kenny’s conduct involved gross negligence or deliberate indifference, or that Kenny proximately caused the constitutional violation.

The court granted summary judgment on Saheed’s general negligence claims because New York law does not allow recovery under general negligence principles for the alleged failure to use appropriate care in making an arrest or initiating a prosecution. It dismissed the New York Constitution claims because Saheed had alternative remedies under the Fourth Amendment and § 1983, and dismissed other state-constitutional theories for the same reasons that the corresponding Fourth Amendment claims failed.

The court also granted summary judgment on the municipal-liability claim against the City of New York. Saheed did not present evidence of a City policy, custom, systemic practice, or deliberately indifferent failure to train that caused the alleged violations.

Disposition

The court concluded that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Saheed’s § 1983 excessive-force claim and state assault-and-battery claims will proceed to trial against Nakelski. His § 1983 failure-to-intervene claim will proceed against Wu and Kenny as to the alleged excessive force. All claims against the City of New York were dismissed, and the Clerk was directed to terminate the case as to the City.

The court also ordered the defendants to refile the full deposition transcripts of Saheed, Kenny, Nakelski, and Wu on the public docket within fourteen days. The remaining parties were ordered to appear for a pretrial conference on May 5, 2020.