Mays v. Andrew William Schroeder

Background

While investigating a homicide in March 2023, Minneapolis Police Department Sergeants Mark Joseph Suchta and Andrew William Schroeder received information — later found to contain a typo — directing them to what turned out to be the wrong address: the home of Yolanda Mays and Tommy Holmes. The sergeants did not suspect Mays or Holmes of involvement in the homicide; they only wanted to speak with residents about a vehicle.

On March 21, 2023, Sergeant Schroeder went to the front door and knocked, but received no answer. While waiting, he noticed mail protruding from an unlocked mailbox attached to the house. He pulled the mail out, read the addresses on the outside of the envelopes (without opening any), and replaced the mail. Sergeant Suchta, rather than going to the front door, walked into a landscaped area — filled with small rocks but no plants — directly beneath the home's front window, stepping over slightly elevated brick edging that separated this area from the front yard. From there, he looked into the living room and saw what appeared to be a motionless infant with a Band-Aid on its finger and what he described as claw-like fingers suggesting the onset of rigor mortis.

The two sergeants were uncertain whether the object was a doll or a real infant. Within minutes, they radioed for emergency assistance. Brooklyn Center Police Officer Alan Douglas Salvosa arrived and was told by the sergeants that they had seen either a very realistic doll or a deceased infant. Officer Salvosa himself looked through the window and concluded he was seeing a real, unresponsive infant. He forced entry through a side door; the sergeants followed him inside. Officers quickly determined the object was a plastic doll. Holmes was found in the basement, upset and confused. Mays was not home at the time but returned to find her door damaged. The City of Brooklyn Center reimbursed Mays for door repairs. Holmes later died and Mays was substituted as trustee for his heirs.

Mays sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute that allows people to sue government officials for violations of constitutional rights. She brought four claims: (1) Sergeant Suchta violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the curtilage (the legally protected area immediately surrounding the home) of her home; (2) Sergeant Schroeder violated the Fourth Amendment by examining her mail; (3) all three officers violated the Fourth Amendment by forcing entry into her home; and (4) the City of Minneapolis is liable under the doctrine from Monell v. Department of Social Services — which allows municipalities to be sued when a constitutional violation results from an official policy, unofficial custom, or deliberate failure to train employees.

All defendants moved for summary judgment (asking the court to rule in their favor without a trial because no genuine factual dispute exists). Mays cross-moved for partial summary judgment against Sergeant Suchta and the City.

Claim 1: Sergeant Suchta's Entry Into the Curtilage

Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and provides especially strong protection for the home and its curtilage — the area immediately surrounding the home. A law enforcement officer's physical intrusion into the curtilage is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

Courts determine whether an area is curtilage by applying four factors from United States v. Dunn: (1) proximity to the home; (2) whether the area is within an enclosure; (3) the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps the resident took to protect the area from observation.

The court found three of the four Dunn factors supported treating the landscaped area as curtilage:

- Proximity: The area directly abutted the home and was immediately beneath the living room window — as close as possible without being inside. - Enclosure: Although there was no fence, the raised brick edging clearly demarcated the landscaped area from the front yard, requiring someone to step over it to enter. This physical boundary served the purpose the enclosure factor is designed to capture. - Protection from observation: Mays's undisputed testimony was that no visitors walk in the landscaped area. Sergeant Suchta himself acknowledged it is not an area a delivery person would generally enter. The rock-covered surface provided no welcoming path, and the mail carrier's route passed outside the landscaped area. These facts indicated Mays did not intend outsiders to enter.

The third factor — use of the area for private or intimate activities — weighed slightly against curtilage because the area had no plants, furniture, or other evidence of personal use.

On balance, the court concluded the landscaped area was curtilage. It further rejected Sergeant Suchta's argument that entering the curtilage was justified by the need to contact residents. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, officers may deviate from the front door into curtilage only when they have a reasonable belief someone is home — a fact the sergeant's own counsel conceded was absent here. Sergeant Suchta's own testimony that looking through a window is a "common tactic" he always uses confirmed that his intrusion was not driven by any belief someone was inside. The court therefore found a Fourth Amendment violation.

Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability unless they violated a "clearly established" right — meaning every reasonable officer would have understood the conduct was unlawful. The court found Mays's rights were clearly established by March 2023, citing: Oliver v. United States (1984, establishing curtilage receives Fourth Amendment protection); Florida v. Jardines (2013, Supreme Court specifically noting that police violate the Fourth Amendment by entering a person's property "to observe his repose from just outside the front window"); and United States v. Burston (Eighth Circuit 2015, holding an area six to ten inches from an apartment window is curtilage). The court granted Mays's motion for partial summary judgment on this claim and denied Sergeant Suchta's motion.

Claim 2: Sergeant Schroeder's Examination of Mail

The court granted Sergeant Schroeder's motion for summary judgment on this claim. While sealed letters are protected by the Fourth Amendment, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in (a) an unlocked, accessible mailbox — because mail carriers (government officials) regularly open it — or (b) the address information on the outside of envelopes. Sergeant Schroeder did not open any mail; he read only the outside of the envelopes and replaced them. Because Mays had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these items, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

Claim 3: Forced Entry Into the Home

Sergeants Suchta and Schroeder

The court denied the sergeants' motion for summary judgment on this claim. While officers may enter a home without a warrant in genuine emergencies — the "exigent circumstances" exception — that exception does not apply when officers themselves created the emergency by violating the Fourth Amendment. Here, the sergeants only saw the apparent infant because Sergeant Suchta illegally entered the curtilage to look through the window. Because the exigency was created by Suchta's Fourth Amendment violation, and Schroeder witnessed that violation, neither sergeant could rely on the exception to justify forcing entry. The court raised this issue (derived from Kentucky v. King) on its own after it was surfaced at oral argument, noting it was antecedent to and ultimately dispositive of the exigent circumstances arguments. Qualified immunity did not help the sergeants because, by 2011, it was clearly established that officers cannot invoke exigent circumstances they created through a Fourth Amendment violation.

Officer Salvosa

The court granted Officer Salvosa's motion for summary judgment. In a Section 1983 suit, each defendant's conduct must be assessed individually; liability is personal, not by association. Officer Salvosa was never told how the sergeants came to see the doll — he did not know they had violated the Fourth Amendment — so he could not be charged with knowledge of the tainted exigency. He arrived, was told the sergeants had seen either a realistic doll or a distressed infant, looked through the window himself, and genuinely believed he saw an unmoving infant. The court found that an objectively reasonable officer in his position would have concluded an emergency existed, and declined to second-guess that judgment based on information Salvosa did not have at the time (such as how long the sergeants had been waiting, or that a garage key was available). The court rejected each of Mays's arguments against this conclusion, finding they improperly relied on hindsight or facts not known to Salvosa when he entered.

Claim 4: Municipal Liability (Monell Claim Against the City of Minneapolis)

The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Mays's competing motion.

Mays's Monell theory rested on Sergeant Suchta's deposition testimony that he was trained by Minneapolis Police Department field training officers to have one officer go to the front door and another stand "off to the side." The court evaluated all three routes to Monell liability:

- Official policy: Mays offered no evidence that the field training officers had final policymaking authority for the City. Without that showing, no official policy was established.

- Unofficial custom: An unconstitutional custom requires a widespread and persistent pattern of misconduct. Mays offered only a single incident — her own — which is legally insufficient to establish a custom.

- Failure to train: To show deliberate indifference through a failure to train, a plaintiff must typically show either a pattern of prior violations (putting the city on notice) or a training gap so obvious that constitutional violations were inevitable. Here, there was no pattern. Nor did the training itself mandate unconstitutional conduct: Sergeant Suchta testified only that he was trained to stand "off to the side" — a facially lawful instruction capable of being followed without any Fourth Amendment violation. Because the training did not require looking through windows, there was no direct causal link between the training and the unconstitutional act. Notably, Sergeant Suchta also testified he was trained on Fourth Amendment curtilage principles, which the court said confirms his illegal conduct reflected his own shortcomings, not inadequate training.

Disposition Summary

- Mays's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 83): Granted in part as to Sergeant Suchta (curtilage violation); denied in part as to the City of Minneapolis. - Defendants Schroeder, Suchta, and City's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 67): Granted in part (as to the City on the Monell claim and as to Sergeant Schroeder on the mailbox/mail claim); denied in part (as to Sergeant Suchta on the curtilage claim and as to the claim that Sergeant Schroeder wrongfully entered the home). - Officer Salvosa's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 69): Granted.