Segrede v. Bernardo

Background

Javon Segrede, represented by counsel, was detained before trial at the Anna M. Kross Center and the Vernon C. Bain Center on Rikers Island. He alleged that he was vulnerable because of his sexual orientation and that the Department of Correction failed to follow its procedures for placing vulnerable inmates in protective custody. He testified that another inmate sexually assaulted him three times in March 2018 at the Vernon C. Bain Center. Segrede also alleged that Officer Saeed Bernard groped his buttocks and threatened to harm him if he reported it.

The operative complaint asserted two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. The first claim sought to hold the City liable under Monell for an alleged policy or practice of failing to follow protective-custody procedures. The second claim was against Officer Bernard for an alleged due-process violation. Only the City moved for summary judgment.

The protective-custody events

When Segrede entered Department of Correction custody on February 17, 2018, he told staff that he did not identify as gay and did not have safety concerns. He later requested protective custody on March 1 after reporting threats and fear of attack. Department officials investigated the request and placed him in protective custody.

After Segrede fought with another inmate on March 8, officials transferred him from protective custody to general population. On March 15, when he arrived at the Vernon C. Bain Center, he asked an unidentified correctional officer for a protective-custody request form. The officer allegedly replied, “We’re not doing that today.” Segrede also asked to speak with a captain, but that request was denied. He was placed in general population, where he testified that another inmate sexually assaulted him twice and attempted to assault him a third time. After Segrede reported the assaults, the Department of Correction sent him to Bellevue Hospital and later placed him in protective custody.

The court’s analysis

The court limited its review to the theory pleaded in the second amended complaint: that the Department of Correction had a custom or practice of failing to follow protective-custody procedures. The court refused to consider Segrede’s different argument, raised for the first time in opposition to summary judgment, that the Department failed to comply with the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act. A party may not use opposition papers to add a new claim or change the claim in the complaint.

The court found that the City had a formal protective-custody policy. That policy required the Department to give inmates an opportunity to request protective custody and required staff receiving such a request to notify a captain and keep the inmate separated from others while the request was evaluated. The court concluded that the unidentified officer’s refusal to provide Segrede with a form or let him speak with a captain violated that policy.

The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to create a factual dispute about whether Segrede was sexually assaulted while in general population. The court noted that Segrede’s deposition answer denying sexual contact with another inmate could affect how a fact-finder viewed his testimony, but it did not eliminate the other evidence supporting his account.

However, a municipality generally cannot be held responsible under Monell merely because one employee committed an unlawful act. Segrede had to provide evidence that the violation resulted from a widespread and well-established practice, or custom, that policymakers effectively allowed to continue. The court found no evidence that Department of Correction personnel regularly ignored or prevented protective-custody requests. Instead, the record showed that Segrede’s other requests were granted, that officials had accommodated protective-custody requests during other incarcerations, and that officials placed him in protective custody after learning of the assaults. Segrede also offered no evidence that the alleged practice affected anyone else.

Disposition

Judge McMahon granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on Claim I and dismissed the City as a defendant. The court did not grant summary judgment on the claim against Officer Bernard because he had not filed such a motion. That claim remained for trial, which the court directed the parties to be ready for beginning September 23, 2024.