Gjenashaj v. City of New York
- Colleen McMahon
- 1:19-cv-04142
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 9
In Gjenashaj v. City of New York, Judge Pauley granted Lieutenant Harrison’s summary-judgment motion in part and denied it in part.
Lori Gjenashaj’s excessive-force claim against Lieutenant Matthew Harrison continues, while her supervisory-liability claim against him was dismissed; the court’s ruling addressed Harrison’s motion, not the entire action.
What happened
In Gjenashaj v. City of New York, Lori Gjenashaj sued the City and two New York City police officers, alleging excessive force and failure to supervise. Lieutenant Matthew Harrison asked the court to rule for him without a trial.
The parties gave sharply different accounts of whether Gjenashaj pointed a pistol at the officers, whether she exited the vehicle holding it, and whether she had raised her hands in surrender. Gjenashaj was shot twice, and Harrison fired one shot.
Judge Pauley denied Harrison’s motion on the excessive-force claim because the disputed facts could allow a jury to find that the shooting was unreasonable and that qualified immunity did not apply. The court granted the motion on the supervisory-liability claim, which it dismissed.
The detailed version
- Gjenashaj v. City of New York · No. 1:19-cv-04142
- Colleen McMahon
- Dec. 14, 2020
Background
Lori Gjenashaj brought a federal civil-rights action against the City of New York and two New York City Police Department officers. She asserted an excessive-force claim and a supervisory-liability claim against Lieutenant Matthew Harrison. Harrison moved for summary judgment, asking the court to resolve the claims in his favor without a trial.
The incident began when Gjenashaj fired two blank rounds from a starter pistol at her daughter and mother-in-law inside a Staten Island home. She fled in a sport utility vehicle, later went to a friend’s home while holding the pistol, and was eventually located by police. Harrison and Officer Giancarlo Maratea approached the vehicle with their firearms drawn.
The parties disputed what happened immediately before the shooting. Harrison said Gjenashaj pointed the pistol toward him from inside the vehicle and later emerged while holding it in a two-handed shooting stance. Gjenashaj said she never pointed the pistol at Harrison, exited without the pistol, and held up her hands to signal surrender. It was undisputed that she was shot twice, that Harrison fired one shot after hearing a popping sound, and that she later resisted arrest by kicking Harrison.
Excessive Force and Qualified Immunity
The court held that Harrison was personally involved because he was present, fired his weapon, and carried out Gjenashaj’s arrest. It analyzed the excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard. Deadly force is reasonable only when an officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious injury to the officer or others.
The court concluded that genuine disputes of material fact prevented summary judgment. If Gjenashaj’s account were believed, a jury could find that she exited without the pistol and was shot while her hands were raised, and could therefore find that Harrison lacked probable cause to believe she posed a significant threat. The same factual disputes also prevented summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which protects officials from damages when their conduct does not violate a clearly established legal right.
Supervisory Liability
Gjenashaj argued that Harrison was liable as a supervisor because he was the highest-ranking officer at the scene and failed to require a body-worn camera, follow procedures for emotionally disturbed individuals, follow other police guidelines, and use protective shields or non-lethal methods.
The court held that Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for violations of police best practices or departmental policies alone. It also determined that the allegations about protective shields and non-lethal force were part of the excessive-force claim rather than a separate supervisory-liability claim. The court therefore dismissed the supervisory-liability claim.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part Harrison’s motion for summary judgment. It denied the motion on the excessive-force claim and granted it on the supervisory-liability claim. The clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion.
Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.