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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled June 27, 2024

Broughton v. Truist Bank

Judge
Laura Swain
Docket
1:23-cv-06042
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
7
Motion to DismissCivil ProcedurePro Se
In one sentence

In Broughton v. Truist Bank, Judge Swain dismissed the action after amended pleadings still failed to state a claim.

Who this affects

Tyrell Broughton’s federal claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the court declined to hear his state-law claims. Truist Bank was the defendant in the dismissed action. Broughton was not granted another opportunity to amend and was denied fee-free status for an appeal.

What happened

In Broughton v. Truist Bank, Tyrell Broughton sued Truist Bank over an automobile loan. He claimed that the loan contract was invalid, that the bank violated multiple federal laws, and that he was entitled to clear title to the vehicle, debt cancellation, and money damages.

The court had already dismissed his first complaint because it did not explain the facts supporting his claims, but allowed him to file an amended complaint. The court found that the amended complaint still did not provide facts supporting claims under the laws Broughton cited. It also declined to hear his state-law claims, including breach of contract and claims involving the Uniform Commercial Code.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, declined to grant another opportunity to amend, and directed the Clerk to enter judgment. Judge Swain also ruled that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free status for an appeal.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Broughton v. Truist Bank · No. 1:23-cv-06042
Judge
Laura Swain
Date
June 27, 2024

Background

Tyrell Broughton proceeded without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee. He sued Truist Bank, invoking federal-question jurisdiction and alleging that the bank violated his rights in connection with an automobile loan. His original filing attached documents concerning a retail installment contract, communications about the loan balance, and monthly statements. It also included references to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, but did not set out facts explaining what conduct violated that statute or other federal laws.

On January 23, 2024, the court dismissed the original complaint for failure to state a claim because it did not provide the short and plain statement required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court allowed Broughton to file an amended complaint and explained that, if he intended to rely on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, he needed to allege facts showing that the debt arose from a consumer transaction, that Truist Bank qualified as a debt collector, and that the bank engaged in conduct prohibited by the statute.

In the amended complaint, Broughton asserted breach of contract and alleged violations of the Uniform Commercial Code, House Joint Resolution 192, Public Law 73-10, the Federal Reserve Act, federal banking laws, and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. He alleged that the automobile contract became invalid because Truist Bank failed to disclose an option concerning an alleged security interest. He sought to eliminate the debt, obtain clear title to the vehicle, and recover $300,000.

Federal Claims

The court dismissed the claims based on House Joint Resolution 192 because Broughton alleged no facts showing that the resolution applied to Truist Bank’s conduct. The court explained that the resolution concerns contracts requiring payment in gold and that courts have generally rejected theories asserting that debts are unenforceable because lenders provided credit rather than legal tender.

The court also found that Broughton failed to state claims under the Federal Reserve Act, federal banking laws, and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations because he did not explain how those laws applied to his allegations. Although some attachments referred to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the court found that Broughton did not allege facts supporting a claim under that statute.

State Claims and Further Amendment

Broughton also asserted state-law claims, including breach of contract and claims involving the Uniform Commercial Code. The court explained that the Uniform Commercial Code is a set of model laws adopted by states, not a federal law. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning its authority to hear related state-law claims in the same case. The court also noted that Broughton had not alleged facts establishing diversity jurisdiction or showing that he could state a viable state-law claim.

Because Broughton had already received an opportunity to amend and the amended complaint did not suggest that further amendment would produce viable claims, the court declined to grant another opportunity to amend.

Disposition

The court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Broughton might be asserting. The court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, denied fee-free status for purposes of an appeal, and directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment. Judge Laura Taylor Swain signed the order.

The authoritative version

Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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