D'Aguilar v. US Bank Trust NA LSF9 Master Participation Trust

Background

Dawn D’Aguilar, proceeding without a lawyer and without prepaying filing fees, sued US Bank Trust NA, LSF9 Master Participation Trust. Her claims concerned state-court foreclosure proceedings involving real property in Bronx County, New York. She invoked the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), a federal statute requiring certain disclosures in consumer-credit transactions, and diversity jurisdiction, which can allow a federal court to hear state-law claims involving citizens of different states.

D’Aguilar listed eleven alleged TILA violations but provided no factual allegations explaining what the defendant did to violate the statute. She also alleged that the defendant lacked standing or legal capacity to start the foreclosure proceedings, relied on allegedly false mortgage assignments, and was not properly registered to conduct business. She sought compensatory and punitive damages, removal of the mortgage from her credit report, and other relief. The complaint referred to constitutional violations but did not identify a government defendant.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the screening requirement for complaints filed without prepaying filing fees. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss such a complaint if it is frivolous, seeks relief from an immune defendant, or fails to state a legally sufficient claim. The court also must dismiss claims over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, meaning the court’s legal authority to hear them.

Truth in Lending Act claims

The court dismissed the TILA claims for failure to state a claim. It explained that merely listing statutory provisions and labels for alleged violations does not satisfy the requirement that a complaint provide enough facts to make liability plausible. The court noted, but did not decide, that some TILA damages claims might also be untimely because the complaint did not state when D’Aguilar entered the mortgage loan agreement.

Constitutional claims

The court treated D’Aguilar’s references to constitutional violations as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a law that permits claims for constitutional violations committed by government actors. The court held that the complaint did not state such a claim because the named defendant was not alleged to be part of a government body and appeared to be a private entity. Private parties generally are not liable under Section 1983 unless the required government involvement is alleged.

Diversity jurisdiction and state-law claims

The court found that the complaint did not adequately establish diversity jurisdiction. D’Aguilar alleged residence in New York but did not adequately allege her citizenship, which depends on domicile—the person’s fixed home and intent to remain there. The complaint also was unclear about whether the defendant was U.S. Bank N.A., the bank acting as trustee, or the trust itself. It did not provide the facts needed to determine the relevant citizenship of the bank, trustee, or trust.

The court noted that claims based on alleged harm caused by the foreclosure judgment could be barred by the rule preventing federal district courts from reviewing state-court judgments. It also stated that claims based on alleged misconduct before the foreclosure proceeding were not apparently barred by that rule, although other legal doctrines could still prevent relitigation. The court did not resolve those issues because it could not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the state-law claims. After dismissing the federal claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims, over those claims.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and granted D’Aguilar 30 days to amend the complaint to provide additional facts supporting her federal claims or diversity jurisdiction. The court directed that judgment would be entered if she did not timely amend or request an extension. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without prepaying fees. The clerk was directed to keep the matter open until a civil judgment was entered.