Lopes v. City of New York

Background

Vincenzo Lopes and Barbara Carraro-Jules sued the City of New York. The complaint also named the Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York, but the plaintiffs conceded that the Comptroller’s Office was not a suable entity. The court directed the Clerk to remove that office from the caption.

The plaintiffs alleged that they were practicing Catholics and had worked for the Comptroller’s Office until February 11, 2022. After working remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic, they were subject to the City’s October 2021 vaccination requirement for City employees. The requirement allowed for legally required reasonable accommodations. The plaintiffs applied for religious exemptions based on their Catholic beliefs, but the City denied their requests. They were then placed on unpaid leave and terminated.

The plaintiffs alleged that other City employees received religious accommodations and were not terminated. They also alleged that the vaccination requirement was repealed or amended in February 2023, but that they were not rehired or allowed to return to their former jobs.

The complaint asserted three counts. Count One combined claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, with claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Counts Two and Three asserted claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The City moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim.

Constitutional claims

The court held that the vaccination requirement was neutral because it applied to all City employees and did not single out employees who remained unvaccinated for religious reasons. It also held that the requirement was generally applicable. The plaintiffs’ allegation that other employees received religious exemptions was considered conclusory because they did not identify those employees or the accommodations they allegedly received.

Because the requirement was neutral and generally applicable, the court applied rational-basis review, a deferential test asking whether the government’s action is rationally related to a legitimate objective. The court concluded that the vaccination requirement satisfied that test because protecting public health was a legitimate goal and requiring vaccination was rationally related to that goal. The plaintiffs did not challenge the legitimacy of protecting public health or argue that vaccination was unrelated to that objective.

The court also rejected the Equal Protection claim. The plaintiffs did not provide sufficient facts showing that similarly situated people were treated differently because of religion or another impermissible reason. The court noted that the allegation that some people received religious accommodations suggested favorable treatment based on religion rather than adverse treatment because of religion. The court further stated that the plaintiffs’ allegations that their termination was pretextual and that the City was hostile to their beliefs were conclusory.

The court additionally noted that the plaintiffs had not pleaded a proper basis for imposing municipal liability on the City for constitutional violations by its employees.

Title VII claims

The court stated that the plaintiffs waived their Title VII claims by failing to respond to the City’s arguments in their opposition papers. The court also considered the claims on their substance and found them inadequately pleaded. The plaintiffs offered no facts beyond conclusory statements suggesting that their termination was pretextual, that the vaccination requirement was hostile to their beliefs, or that the requirement was applied in a way that created a religion-based disparity.

The court separately addressed the plaintiffs’ failure-to-accommodate theory. It distinguished a reasonable accommodation from a blanket exemption. The plaintiffs alleged that they sought exemptions allowing them to remain in their jobs without being vaccinated, but did not allege that they requested a specific accommodation. The court held that Title VII did not require the City to grant the blanket religious exemption the plaintiffs sought.

OSHA claim

The plaintiffs also argued that the vaccination requirement violated or was preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The court found that the plaintiffs did not clearly explain the basis of this claim. It held that neither OSHA nor the Supremacy Clause provides a private right of action allowing these plaintiffs to bring the claim themselves.

Request to supplement

The plaintiffs asked to supplement their complaint under Rule 15(d), which allows a court to permit allegations about events occurring after the original pleading. They made the request in their opposition brief rather than by motion. The court held that this procedure was improper and denied the request.

The court also held that the proposed supplementation would be futile, meaning the added allegations would not state a viable claim. The allegation concerning the later repeal or amendment of the vaccination requirement did not establish standing because the plaintiffs did not allege that the change affected them or that they had sought reinstatement. The proposed OSHA allegations were also futile for the reasons discussed above.

State-law claims and disposition

After resolving the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over Counts Two and Three. The court therefore did not resolve those non-federal claims on their merits.

The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Count One, denied the plaintiffs’ request to supplement their complaint, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims, directed entry of judgment in favor of the City, and ordered the case closed.