Colson v. Annucci

Background

Ronald R. Colson, an inmate proceeding without a lawyer, sued Commissioner Anthony J. Annucci, Superintendent Michael Capra, Sergeant Israel Sanchez, Correctional Officers Dalton Beadle, Knika Green, Alfred Ross, and Raymond Ortiz, Senior Offender Rehabilitation Counselor Jonia Manuel, Director of Special Housing Unit Don Venettozzi, and the State of New York. Colson brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for violations of constitutional rights. Annucci had previously been terminated from the case for lack of personal involvement.

The motion addressed in this opinion was filed by Capra, Sanchez, Beadle, Green, Ross, Ortiz, Manuel, and Venettozzi. They asked the court to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a legally sufficient claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

According to the complaint, on July 18, 2019, Beadle, Sanchez, and a non-party identified as “John Doe” strip-searched Colson. Colson was then escorted while restrained to an infirmary for a special contraband watch. Green and Ross collected green leafy substances found on the elevator floor and the second floor of the infirmary, and Sanchez received the substances. Colson was strip-searched again before entering the contraband-watch room.

Colson was later charged with refusing a direct order, possessing contraband and drugs, making false statements or providing false information, and smuggling. A hearing officer found him guilty and imposed 45 days in the Special Housing Unit without visitation, packages, commissary, or telephone access, according to the complaint. On administrative review, Venettozzi reversed the hearing result and ordered a rehearing. After the rehearing, all charges were dismissed. Colson also alleged that he was held in the Special Housing Unit from January 6 through January 28, 2020, without sanctions.

First Amendment retaliation claim

Colson alleged that Sanchez, Beadle, Green, and Ross manufactured charges against him in retaliation for using the prison grievance process. The court recognized that filing grievances is protected conduct, but held that Colson did not provide enough facts showing the other two required elements of retaliation: an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising constitutional rights, and a causal connection between the grievances and the alleged retaliation.

The court found that Colson did not identify specifically what he did before receiving the disciplinary charges. It also found that he did not provide the context or contents of the grievances, so the complaint did not support an inference that the grievances substantially contributed to the defendants’ actions. The court therefore dismissed the First Amendment claim without prejudice and granted leave to amend with more details about the protected activity and the adverse action.

Fourth Amendment search claim

The court held that prison searches, including strip searches, must be reasonable. It concluded that Colson sufficiently alleged that the second strip search violated the Fourth Amendment. The second search occurred shortly after the first, Colson remained restrained and escorted between the searches, and he therefore had no opportunity to obtain or conceal contraband. The complaint also did not connect the substances found near him to Colson.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim. It further ruled that Sanchez and Beadle were not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The court found that the alleged second strip search violated a clearly established right and that the defendants had not shown that a reasonably competent officer would have acted the same way under these circumstances.

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due-process claim

Colson alleged that all the moving defendants violated his right to procedural due process through the disciplinary proceedings and confinement. To state this type of claim, he had to allege both a protected liberty interest and a deprivation of that interest without adequate procedures.

The court held that Colson did not allege facts showing an atypical and significant hardship. It focused on the alleged 45-day Special Housing Unit sanction and the lack of allegations showing unusually harsh conditions. The court stated that even if it accepted Colson’s assertion in his opposition that he spent 135 days in confinement through January 28, 2020, he still had not shown the type of hardship needed to create a protected liberty interest. The court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim without prejudice and granted leave to amend with additional details. Because Colson had not established a protected liberty interest, the court did not decide whether Capra was personally involved.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss. It granted the motion as to the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied it as to the Fourth Amendment claim. It also ruled that Sanchez and Beadle were not entitled to qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment claim.

Colson was allowed to file an amended pleading by October 10, 2024. The court stated that an amended complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint. If Colson did not file an amended complaint by the deadline, the claims dismissed without prejudice would be deemed dismissed with prejudice.