Samuels v. The Urban Assembly, Inc.

Background

Melissa Samuels alleged that Urban Assembly Charter School for Computer Science and its founding principal, David Noah, hired her as a math teacher in August 2021. She alleged that a student struck her in the head with a ball on June 9, 2022, causing a concussion, head and neck pain, blurred vision, and difficulty sleeping, reading, concentrating, thinking, driving, and moving her head and neck.

Samuels alleged that she reported the incident to police despite Noah’s instruction not to provide police with information about the student. She then sent Urban Assembly a doctor’s note excusing her from work for ten days and stating that she could return on June 21, 2022. Noah sought additional medical documentation, questioned her account of the incident, and stated that the requested leave was not supported by the note. Urban Assembly terminated her employment on June 16, 2022. Samuels also alleged that Urban Assembly withheld approximately $1,700 from her final paycheck for a laptop even though she had returned it.

Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Samuels had not pleaded enough facts to support any of her claims. On such a motion, the court evaluates whether the complaint plausibly states a claim, accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and does not decide whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail.

Rulings on the Claims

Disability discrimination. The court denied the motion to dismiss Samuels’s disability-discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Under the federal law, the court found that Samuels plausibly alleged a physical impairment that substantially limited major life activities. Her allegations about her pain and difficulty seeing, sleeping, reading, concentrating, thinking, and performing physical movements were sufficient at the pleading stage. The court also found that her education, teaching experience, positive performance feedback, and raise supported an inference that she was qualified for her job. Finally, the close timing between her injury, leave request, and termination supported a minimal inference that the termination was related to her disability.

Failure to accommodate. The court denied the motion as to Samuels’s claims that Defendants failed to accommodate her disability under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. The court concluded that temporary medical leave could be a reasonable accommodation because it was finite and the doctor’s note indicated that Samuels could return to work on June 21. Samuels plausibly alleged that Defendants knew about her condition, that she requested leave, and that Defendants refused the accommodation by seeking additional documentation and terminating her employment. Whether the parties adequately participated in the required process for evaluating an accommodation was a fact-intensive question that the court found premature to decide.

Retaliation under the ADA and NYSHRL. The court denied the motion as to Samuels’s ADA retaliation claim. Requesting a reasonable accommodation is protected activity under the ADA, and the six-day period between her request for leave and termination supported a plausible causal connection.

The court granted the motion as to Samuels’s NYSHRL retaliation claim. It explained that, unlike the ADA, the NYSHRL does not treat a request for a reasonable accommodation by itself as protected activity. Although Samuels alleged in general terms that she opposed unlawful conduct, the court found that she did not identify a practice prohibited by the NYSHRL that she had opposed.

Retaliation under the NYCHRL. The court denied the motion as to the NYCHRL retaliation claim. The court noted that New York City law expressly protects a person who requests a reasonable accommodation, and it found the claim plausible for the same reasons supporting the ADA retaliation claim.

Aiding and abetting claims against Noah. The court denied the motion as to Samuels’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL aiding-and-abetting claims against Noah, except for the claim based on NYSHRL retaliation. Aiding-and-abetting liability can apply when an individual participates in an employer’s discriminatory conduct. The court found that Samuels plausibly alleged that Noah participated in the challenged conduct, including by terminating her employment. Because Samuels did not state an underlying NYSHRL retaliation claim, she also could not state an aiding-and-abetting claim based on that retaliation theory.

New York whistleblower claim. The court denied the motion as to Samuels’s claim under New York Labor Law § 740. Samuels alleged that Noah instructed her not to provide police with information about the student and that she objected by continuing to report the incident. The court found that she plausibly alleged protected activity, a retaliatory action through the disabling of her account and termination, and a causal connection based on the timing and Noah’s emails. At the pleading stage, she did not have to identify the specific law, rule, or regulation that she reasonably believed Defendants were violating.

First Amendment retaliation. The court granted the motion as to Samuels’s First Amendment retaliation claim. A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires conduct attributable to a state actor or someone acting under state law. The court found that Samuels did not plausibly allege that Urban Assembly’s employment decisions were fairly attributable to the State. The court further held that, even assuming state action, her police report was pleaded as an individualized report of an assault rather than speech addressing a broader public concern.

Wage deduction claim. The court denied the motion as to Samuels’s New York Labor Law wage-deduction claim against Urban Assembly. Her allegation that Urban Assembly withheld approximately $1,700 for a laptop she had returned was sufficiently specific to plausibly allege an unauthorized wage deduction.

Disposition

Judge Ronnie Abrams held that Defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The motion was denied as to all claims except Samuels’s NYSHRL retaliation claim and First Amendment retaliation claim, which the court dismissed. The opinion does not state that the surviving claims were proven; it holds only that they could proceed beyond the pleading stage.