Kewazinga Corp. v. Google LLC
- Lorna Schofield
- 1:20-cv-01106
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Kewazinga v. Google, Judge Schofield issued mixed rulings limiting what evidence and arguments could be presented at trial.
Kewazinga Corporation and Google LLC, particularly the evidence and arguments they may present at trial.
What happened
In Kewazinga Corporation v. Google LLC, Google asked the court to bar several categories of evidence and argument before trial, including evidence about its acquisitions, pretrial proceedings, its size and revenue, patent-review decisions, and alleged infringement or copying. The court resolved all five motions.
The court denied Google’s first motion, allowing evidence about its acquisitions subject to limits on discussing acquisition prices or calling Google a “monopoly” or similar term. It granted the second motion, granted part of the third and denied part without prejudice, granted the fourth, and denied the fifth, while barring Kewazinga from explicitly saying Google “copied” or “stole” its technology.
Judge Schofield’s order limited the evidence and arguments that could be presented to the jury but did not decide the patent claims’ merits. The clerk was directed to close the five motions.
The detailed version
- Kewazinga Corp. v. Google LLC · No. 1:20-cv-01106
- Lorna Schofield
- Sept. 9, 2024
Background
Google filed five motions in limine, which are requests to decide before trial whether particular evidence or arguments may be presented to the jury. The court resolved each motion under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rulings on the Motions
Motion in Limine No. 1
Google’s motion to preclude Kewazinga from offering evidence, argument, discussion, or opinions about Google’s acquisitions was denied. The court found that the fact and nature of the acquisitions were relevant to Kewazinga’s damages case. The ruling was subject to Kewazinga’s agreement not to introduce evidence about the prices of the acquisitions and not to use “monopoly,” “monopolist,” or similar derogatory terms to characterize Google’s business.
Motion in Limine No. 2
Google’s motion to preclude evidence, argument, discussion, or opinions about pretrial proceedings and issues—including discovery, discovery disputes, claim construction, and dispositive-motion practice—was granted. The court found that those matters had little, if any, value in helping the jury decide the case and could confuse the jury. Kewazinga could explain that its damages methodology relied on the financial information available, but could not criticize the pretrial proceedings. The jury would be instructed to apply the court’s claim constructions.
Motion in Limine No. 3
The motion was resolved in two parts:
- Google’s motion to preclude evidence, argument, discussion, or opinions about its size, wealth, or overall revenue was granted under Evidence Rule 403 because the court found the information had little, if any, value and created a risk of unfair prejudice concerning both liability and damages. - Google’s motion to preclude Ms. Riley from affirmatively relying on or testifying about Google’s search-advertising revenue, or using that revenue as a “reasonableness check,” was denied without prejudice to renewal after the court decided Google’s renewed challenge to Ms. Riley’s supplemental expert opinion. “Without prejudice to renewal” means the issue could be raised again as described in the order.
Motion in Limine No. 4
Google’s motion to exclude testimony, argument, or references to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s denials of institution of inter partes review petitions was granted. The court found that those denials had limited, if any, value because the Board did not and could not address the system prior art on which Google relied for invalidity. The court also found a substantial risk that the decisions would confuse, distract, or mislead the jury. The ruling did not bar references to statements made by the parties before the Board.
Motion in Limine No. 5
Google’s request to preclude evidence or argument suggesting that it willfully infringed the asserted patents was denied because the request was procedurally improper and, in substance, an untimely motion for summary judgment. Google’s request to preclude evidence or argument suggesting that it copied or stole Kewazinga’s technology was also denied, except that Kewazinga could not explicitly state that Google “copied” or “stole” the technology. The opinion states that Kewazinga did not oppose that limitation.
Disposition
The court ordered the clerk to enter the five rulings as the summary disposition of the motions and to close the motions at Docket Nos. 341, 342, 343, 344, and 345. This was an evidentiary and pretrial order; it did not decide the underlying patent claims.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.