Kewazinga Corp. v. Google LLC

Background

Kewazinga moved to exclude portions of Google’s damages expert Paul K. Meyer’s opinions and testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. Specifically, Kewazinga sought to prevent Meyer from relying on the redacted Agreement when forming his opinion about the reasonable royalty for the patents-in-suit. Kewazinga argued that Meyer’s analysis improperly relied on the Agreement, used unsupported reasoning, and created unfair prejudice.

Rule 702 Analysis

Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It requires the testimony to be based on sufficient facts or data, reliable methods, and a reliable application of those methods to the facts. The court explained that it must determine whether the expert is qualified, whether the opinion rests on reliable data and methodology, and whether the testimony will assist the factfinder.

The court denied Kewazinga’s request to exclude Meyer’s reliance on the Agreement under Rule 702. Meyer relied on another Google expert’s analysis to assess the technological comparability of the relevant patents. Meyer then performed his own economic analysis of the similarities and differences between the Agreement and a hypothetical licensing agreement between the parties, supplemented by his thirty years of experience in negotiations. The court found that this was enough to establish baseline comparability.

The court explained that a license need not be perfectly analogous to be admissible. Further questions about the degree of comparability concerned the weight of the evidence, meaning how persuasive the evidence should be, rather than its admissibility. Those questions could be explored through cross-examination and decided by the jury. The court also rejected the argument that Meyer’s reliance on his experience required exclusion.

Rule 403 Analysis and Disposition

Rule 403 permits exclusion when relevant evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court ruled that Meyer’s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial and rejected Kewazinga’s argument that the jury might be unduly influenced merely because Meyer was an expert.

The court ordered that Kewazinga’s motion to exclude Meyer from relying on the Agreement in connection with his reasonable-royalty opinion was denied. The clerk was directed to close the motion at Docket Number 372.