Santiago v. City Of New York

Background

Efrain Santiago, a former New York City Police Department officer, identified as a Black Hispanic man of Puerto Rican ancestry. He sued the City of New York, former Mayor Bill de Blasio, former Police Commissioner James P. O’Neil, and former Police Commissioner Dermot Shea. He alleged discrimination, harassment, unequal treatment, and retaliation based on race, national origin, and color under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

The allegations concerned Santiago’s disciplinary history, including his association with Edwin Roa, unauthorized off-duty employment, failure to follow police procedures, an arrest and conviction for second-degree criminal trespass, violations of an order of protection, internal disciplinary proceedings, suspensions, a recommendation that he be terminated, and his vested retirement from the police department. Santiago compared his treatment with that of Officer Edward Carey, who is white and had also faced charges involving association with Roa and unauthorized off-duty employment.

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is a ruling without a trial when the evidence shows that no genuine dispute over an important fact requires a jury to decide the case.

Time Limits and Administrative Requirements

The court held that all Title VII claims arising on or before October 18, 2018, were time-barred because Santiago filed his administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on August 14, 2019. The court also held that his New York State and New York City human-rights claims arising on or before August 5, 2017, were time-barred because he filed this lawsuit on August 5, 2020.

The court further held that Santiago had not completed the required administrative process for his Title VII claims based on national origin and color. Those claims were dismissed.

Other Claims and Theories

The court dismissed Santiago’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because it held that there was no private right of action under that statute in this case. Santiago voluntarily withdrew his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so those claims were dismissed. He also conceded that he had not brought separate claims for a hostile work environment or retaliation, and the court dismissed those claims.

The court declined to consider a constructive-discharge claim Santiago raised for the first time in his opposition brief. Because constructive discharge was not pleaded in the amended complaint, the court held that Santiago could not add that claim through briefing on the summary-judgment motion.

Discrimination and Unequal-Treatment Claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment-discrimination claims. It held that Santiago could not establish the required elements of a basic discrimination case under Title VII or the New York State Human Rights Law. In the court’s view, the record did not show that he was qualified for his police-officer position, that he experienced a legally adverse employment action, or that any action occurred under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

The court relied on undisputed evidence that Santiago had knowingly associated with a person he knew had a criminal history, disobeyed orders to stop that association, admitted giving false testimony under oath, was convicted of second-degree criminal trespass, and was prohibited by court order from possessing firearms. The court also relied on the police department’s requirement that uniformed officers remain qualified to possess firearms. Because Santiago could not carry a firearm while on patrol and his request to modify the order of protection was denied, the court held that he was legally unqualified for the police-officer position.

The court held that Santiago’s voluntary vested retirement was not an adverse employment action for purposes of his timely Title VII claim. For the timely claims under New York State and New York City law, the court considered the disciplinary findings, the 2018 mitigation hearing, the recommendation of termination, two 30-day suspensions, and the voluntary vested retirement. It held that these events did not amount to materially adverse changes in the terms and conditions of employment. The court also stated that enforcing facially neutral disciplinary policies was not an adverse employment action on the record presented.

The court further held that Santiago presented no evidence connecting the challenged employment actions to his race, color, or national origin. It rejected his general assertions of discriminatory treatment as insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. The court stated that Santiago’s own misconduct, rather than a protected characteristic, led to the challenged employment actions.

On the unequal-treatment claim, the court held that Santiago’s proposed comparators were not sufficiently similar in all important respects. It also found that the one appropriate comparator in the record, Officer Carey, received a harsher penalty: Carey forfeited 45 vacation days and was placed on one-year dismissal probation, while Santiago forfeited a combined 40 vacation days for his misconduct. The court concluded that Santiago was treated better than Carey, defeating the unequal-treatment claim.

Disposition

The court found that no material issue of fact remained for trial and that Santiago had not made a sufficient showing on his Title VII, New York State Human Rights Law, or New York City Human Rights Law claims. Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Santiago’s amended complaint with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and directed the clerk to close the motion.