Dingle v. Riverbay Corporation

Background

Joseph Dingle sued his former employer, Riverbay Corporation, alleging race and color discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Dingle was rehired as a probationary Lobby Attendant in January 2019. His offer letter and the union contract stated that his employment could be terminated during the 12-month probationary period with or without cause.

Riverbay’s policies prohibited employees from using personal vehicles while on duty, clocking in at unauthorized locations, leaving assigned posts without permission, and recording inaccurate time information. The opinion describes multiple warnings and documented incidents involving Dingle. Riverbay investigated allegations that he pretended to clock in at one location while actually clocking in at a garage, used unauthorized time clocks, drove to his car during work time, took extended meal breaks, left his post, and falsely recorded that he was at his post. Dingle admitted that he acted as though he was scanning in and out and that he regularly clocked in and out at Garage 4.

On October 16, 2019, Chief Joseph Riley terminated Dingle before the end of his probationary period. The disciplinary report cited theft of time, being outside his assigned area, operating a private vehicle while on duty without authorization, failing to follow instructions, leaving his post without permission, and violating company rules and policies.

Discrimination claims

Riverbay moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party on a legally important fact.

The court concluded that Dingle had not established the required initial showing for his discrimination claims. Although Dingle was a member of a protected racial group and his termination qualified as an adverse employment action for purposes of the motion, the court found that he had not shown that he performed his probationary duties satisfactorily. The court relied on evidence of repeated policy violations, warnings, and related documentation.

The court also found that Dingle had not shown circumstances supporting an inference that his termination was motivated by race or color. Dingle did not provide evidence of a similarly situated, non-African-American probationary Lobby Attendant who engaged in a comparable number of serious violations and received more favorable treatment. The court found that the employee Dingle identified as a comparator was not probationary and, in any event, had been warned about using a personal vehicle while on duty. The court also noted that Chief Riley was the decisionmaker authorized to order the investigation and that Dingle did not allege that Riley discriminated against him. Because Dingle failed to establish an initial discrimination case, the court did not proceed to the later stages of the burden-shifting analysis.

Retaliation claims

Dingle asserted retaliation under Title VII, § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. He testified that, at an August 21, 2019 meeting, he said he felt discriminated against by supervisor Elizabeth Penn because of how she treated him and Black employees compared with Hispanic employees.

The court held that the statement was too vague to show that Dingle had engaged in legally protected activity because it did not explain what actions he believed were discriminatory or clearly connect them to race. The court further held that Dingle could not show a causal connection between the statement and the investigation leading to his termination. Chief Riley ordered the investigation on July 31, 2019, before the August 21 meeting, and he was not present at that meeting.

The court rejected the New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claim for the same reasons, concluding that Dingle had not adequately shown protected activity, conduct reasonably likely to deter such activity, or a connection between his statement and the employer’s conduct.

Hostile-work-environment claim

The court also rejected Dingle’s hostile-work-environment claims. It found that Dingle had not provided evidence of race- or color-based conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive workplace. His broad assertion that Penn discriminated against him did not describe the actions involved or show that he was treated less favorably because of discriminatory intent.

Disposition

Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. granted Riverbay Corporation’s motion for summary judgment in full. The court dismissed Dingle’s complaint with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion.