Horton v. Cauley

Background

Cory A. Horton worked as a stationary engineer for the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, a department of the City and County of San Francisco. He maintained and repaired the headquarters building’s heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system. On August 12, 2020, three people assaulted him after he exited a train while commuting to work.

Horton told City personnel that he did not feel safe commuting to work and asked about commuting, safety, and security accommodations. In February 2021, he reported additional trauma and requested disability accommodations, including a job change or remote telework. The City began an accommodation process, requested medical information describing his restrictions and expected duration, granted him a temporary leave, and extended that leave six times. Horton’s medical notes repeatedly stated that he could not work but did not identify modified duties he could perform. The City concluded that 100% remote work was not possible for his job because it required in-person attendance.

The City medically separated Horton on November 30, 2021. Horton later filed an administrative complaint alleging denial of the interactive process and reasonable accommodations and retaliation for requesting accommodations. After amendments to his complaint, the City and the SFPUC remained as defendants. The City moved for summary judgment on all 13 remaining claims.

Legal standard

The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view reasonable factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but unsupported or speculative statements are insufficient to create a trial-worthy factual dispute.

Disability and accommodation claims

The court granted summary judgment on Claims 3, 5, 11, and 12, which involved disability discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The court held that the City did not have reason to know Horton had a disability when he first requested safety measures in August 2020. It found that the City’s duty to engage in the disability-accommodation process arose no earlier than February 2021, when Horton reported symptoms and identified his trauma-related condition.

After that point, the court found that the City engaged in the required interactive process, meaning discussions between employer and employee about possible effective accommodations. The City extended Horton’s leave six times and repeatedly requested information about restrictions that might permit him to return to work or perform another job. The court concluded that Horton did not provide that information and was functionally seeking leave of indefinite duration, which the court determined was not a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. The court also found that the record did not support disability discrimination.

The court separately granted summary judgment on Claim 4, Horton’s disability disparate-treatment claim concerning parking passes. It held that the City did not know Horton was disabled when he requested the passes and that the record showed the SFPUC attempted to provide him with one, which Horton declined because driving to work would be expensive.

Hostile-work-environment claim

The court granted summary judgment on Claim 1, Horton’s Title VII hostile-work-environment claim. It held that Horton had not presented the hostile-environment or race-discrimination allegations in his administrative complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the state agency, and those allegations were not reasonably related to the disability-discrimination and retaliation allegations he did present. The court also ruled that the claim failed on the merits because the alleged racial harassment was committed by third parties, not the City or its employees, and the record did not show that the City failed to take reasonable corrective action after learning of the incidents. The court noted that the City repeatedly extended Horton’s leave after learning of the reported incidents.

California Labor Code claim

The court granted summary judgment on Claim 17, brought under California Labor Code section 6311. That statute protects an employee who refuses to perform work when doing so would violate a health or safety standard creating a real and apparent hazard. The court found that Horton was medically separated because the City could not provide the accommodation he sought, not because he refused to work in violation of a safety standard. It also held that Horton had not shown an objectively existing hazard of the type required by the statute.

Retaliation and failure-to-prevent claims

The court granted summary judgment on Claims 2, 6, 13, and 15, which asserted retaliation under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and California Labor Code section 1102.5. The court found that the City had legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the medical separation: it had extended Horton’s leave six times, attempted to engage in the accommodation process, and did not receive information showing how he could return to work even in a reduced capacity. Horton did not show that those reasons were a pretext for retaliation.

The court also granted summary judgment on Claim 14, which alleged that the City failed to prevent discrimination and harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. Because the underlying discrimination and harassment claims failed, the court held that this derivative claim also failed.

Due-process claim

The court granted summary judgment on Claim 9, Horton’s claim that the City violated procedures recognized in Skelly v. State Personnel Board. Those procedures protect a permanent public employee’s property interest in continued employment. The court held that Horton was still a probationary, non-permanent employee when he was medically separated because he had not completed the required 2,080 work hours and had received no credit for prior service. It treated the 2020 end date in his probation notice as a typographical error and concluded that he had no protected property interest or right to a Skelly hearing.

Disposition

The court concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims. It directed the clerk to enter judgment in the defendants’ favor and close the case. The court also denied Horton’s separate request for assistance concerning two police officers as moot.