Malark v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC
- Eric Tostrud
- 0:18-cv-03179
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 42
In Malark v. RBC Capital Markets, Judge Tostrud granted Malark’s partial summary judgment motion, granted RBC’s motion in part, and denied it in part.
Maria Malark’s employment-discrimination and Family and Medical Leave Act claims were narrowed: her Title VII and Minnesota Human Rights Act sex-discrimination claims could proceed, while the other listed claims were resolved for RBC on summary judgment.
What happened
Maria Malark alleged that RBC Capital Markets terminated her employment because she sought leave to care for her seriously ill daughter and because of her sex and family-related characteristics. RBC asked the court to decide the case without a trial.
The court ruled that Malark gave RBC legally sufficient notice that she might need leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, but found no evidence that RBC denied or discouraged that leave or fired her because she sought it. The court also found that a jury could reasonably conclude that RBC discriminated against her because she is a woman. Her other discrimination claims lacked enough evidence of the required connection to her termination.
Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted Malark’s motion for partial summary judgment. He granted RBC’s summary judgment motion as to the Family and Medical Leave Act claims, sex-plus claims, familial-status claim, associational-disability claim, and reprisal claim, but denied it as to Malark’s sex-discrimination claims under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
The detailed version
- Malark v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC · No. 0:18-cv-03179
- Eric Tostrud
- Oct. 14, 2020
Background
Maria Malark worked for RBC from 2000 until October 2017 and served as Director of Operations for U.S. Wealth Management. She alleged that RBC terminated her because she sought or attempted to use leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her daughter, who had serious health problems. She also alleged sex discrimination, sex-plus discrimination based on being a woman with children, familial-status discrimination under Minnesota law, discrimination based on her association with a person with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and reprisal under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA).
RBC contended that it terminated Malark because she did not satisfy the leadership behaviors required by a new organizational leadership model. The record included positive performance reviews, complaints about Malark’s workplace interactions, conflicting evidence about the timing and reasons for the termination decision, and evidence that RBC replaced her with Greg Schwab, who Malark argued was less qualified for the operations position.
FMLA claims
Malark sought partial summary judgment on whether she gave RBC adequate notice of her need for FMLA leave. The court held that she did. The court relied on her communications stating that her daughter had been hospitalized, that she needed time away from work, that she was at the hospital with her daughter, and that she discussed intermittent FMLA leave and her daughter’s health issues with RBC’s leave administrator. The court held that this notice was legally sufficient even though Malark did not complete the FMLA paperwork.
The court nevertheless granted RBC summary judgment on Malark’s FMLA entitlement claim. An entitlement claim asserts that an employer denied or interfered with a benefit provided by the FMLA. The court found that Malark had not identified evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that RBC refused to authorize leave or actually deterred her from seeking it. The court also granted summary judgment on her FMLA discrimination claim. Although notifying an employer of an intent to take FMLA leave was protected activity and her termination was an adverse employment action, Malark first notified RBC of her possible need for leave on June 5, 2017, and was terminated about four months later. The court held that this timing did not establish the required causal connection under applicable Eighth Circuit precedent.
Sex-discrimination claims
The court denied RBC summary judgment on Malark’s sex-discrimination claims under Title VII and the MHRA. It held that a reasonable jury could find that Malark was terminated because of her sex. Among other evidence, Malark identified evidence that RBC replaced her with Schwab, who lacked extensive operations experience and had failed a required licensing examination twice as of his deposition. The court also considered the conflicting evidence about Malark’s performance, the timing of the termination decision, whether alternative positions were considered, and the absence of clear documentation supporting RBC’s explanation.
The court emphasized that RBC had offered a facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination: Malark allegedly did not meet the new leadership model’s criteria. But the court found enough evidence from which a jury could view that explanation as pretext, meaning a stated reason that was not the true reason for the decision. The court therefore held that summary judgment was not appropriate on the Title VII and MHRA sex-discrimination claims.
Other discrimination claims
The court granted RBC summary judgment on Malark’s sex-plus claims under Title VII and the MHRA and on her related MHRA familial-status claim. Malark relied primarily on the fact that RBC terminated her while she was at a hospital with her daughter, on evidence that Schwab was a father, and on her testimony that Versnel increased her responsibilities and scrutinized her work. The court held that this evidence did not permit a reasonable inference of sex-plus or familial-status discrimination, including because there was no evidence that the decisionmakers knew Schwab was a father or that male employees with children were treated differently.
The court also granted RBC summary judgment on Malark’s ADA associational-disability claim and MHRA reprisal claim. Malark relied on the timing between her disclosure of her daughter’s health condition and her termination. The court held that the four-month gap was too long, standing alone, to support a reasonable inference of discrimination or reprisal.
Disposition
The court granted Malark’s motion for partial summary judgment. It granted RBC’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Malark’s FMLA entitlement and discrimination claims, Title VII and MHRA sex-plus claims, MHRA familial-status claim, ADA associational-disability claim, and MHRA reprisal claim. It denied RBC’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Malark’s Title VII and MHRA sex-discrimination claims.
Read the full 42-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.