Johnson v. City of Santa Rosa

Background

John Paul Johnson alleged that the City of Santa Rosa, Officer Sousa, Officer O’Neill, and Sargent De Leon violated his Fourth Amendment rights. His remaining claims included a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, California claims for battery, violation of the Bane Act, and negligence, as well as state-law claims against the City under California Government Code § 815.2. Johnson had voluntarily dismissed his false-arrest claims and, in his opposition, voluntarily dismissed his claims against Sargent De Leon.

The dispute arose from Johnson’s March 23, 2022 arrest. Johnson initially ran after Officer Sousa told him he was under arrest, but he then knelt and lay face down with his hands behind his back. Officer Sousa handcuffed one hand. When Officer O’Neill arrived, he applied a “twist lock” to Johnson’s right arm to move it behind his back for handcuffing. The officers heard a sound, and Johnson was later diagnosed with a fracture to the radial head of his right elbow.

Johnson also alleged that the officers kept him handcuffed with his arms behind his back after they knew or should have known his elbow was injured, causing pain and wrist discomfort. The defendants’ motion focused on the twist-lock maneuver and did not adequately address this separate theory.

Summary-Judgment Standard and Excessive Force

The court explained that excessive force is judged by whether the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances known to them at the time. Relevant considerations include the seriousness of the suspected offense, whether the person posed an immediate threat, whether he was resisting or fleeing, the availability of less forceful alternatives, and whether officers gave warnings.

The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Officer O’Neill’s twist lock caused Johnson’s elbow injury and was unreasonable. Although Johnson had initially fled, the evidence could support a finding that he was no longer resisting when O’Neill applied the hold. O’Neill testified that Johnson did not try to punch or kick him and that he used the twist lock because Johnson might resume resistance. The video and reports could also support a finding that Johnson was not actively resisting at that moment. Because the evidence allowed more than one reasonable interpretation, the court could not decide as a matter of law that O’Neill used reasonable force.

The court denied Officer O’Neill’s request for qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect an officer from liability when the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s conduct was unlawful, but the court stated that disputed facts about whether Johnson was resisting had to be resolved before qualified immunity could be decided.

Officer Sousa’s Liability for the Elbow Injury

Officer Sousa did not apply the twist lock or directly fracture Johnson’s elbow. Johnson therefore relied on an “integral participant” theory, under which an officer may be liable for failing to intervene in an ongoing constitutional violation or for participating in conduct that the officer knew or reasonably should have known would cause the injury.

Johnson conceded this theory as to Sousa at oral argument. The court granted summary judgment for Sousa on his alleged participation in the conduct that fractured Johnson’s elbow. The court also granted summary judgment for Sousa on the related battery, Bane Act, and negligence theories arising from that injury because Johnson did not identify sufficient evidence supporting Sousa’s participation.

State-Law Claims Related to the Elbow Injury

Because California battery claims based on police force are analyzed similarly to excessive-force claims, the court denied summary judgment for Officer O’Neill and the City on the battery claim and granted it for Officer Sousa.

The court denied summary judgment for Officer O’Neill and the City on the Bane Act claim. It found genuine factual disputes about whether O’Neill used excessive force and whether he intentionally interfered with Johnson’s rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion. The court granted summary judgment for Sousa on the Bane Act claim because Johnson did not identify enough evidence that Sousa was an integral participant.

The court denied summary judgment for O’Neill and the City on the negligence claim and granted it for Sousa. The court reasoned that the negligence claim survived as to O’Neill because the related excessive-force and Bane Act claims survived, while Johnson offered no sufficient basis for negligence liability against Sousa.

Handcuffing and Wrist-Injury Theory

The court did not grant summary judgment on Johnson’s claim that the officers caused injury by keeping him handcuffed and failing to move him to a more comfortable position after his elbow was fractured. The defendants had not properly moved for summary judgment on that theory, and their limited reference to the reasonableness of the handcuffing did not adequately address it.

The court also stated that punitive damages could proceed. A reasonable jury could find that O’Neill acted with the required intent because the video showed the injury, O’Neill heard the sound, and he testified that he believed he had injured Johnson. The court could not grant summary judgment on punitive damages tied to the handcuffing and prolonged discomfort because the defendants had not sought judgment on that theory.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims against Sargent De Leon because Johnson had voluntarily dismissed those claims. It granted the motion as to Officer Sousa’s participation in fracturing Johnson’s elbow and the related claims based on that injury. It denied the motion in all other respects, including Officer O’Neill’s qualified-immunity request and the claims concerning O’Neill’s use of the twist lock, the City’s related state-law liability, and the officers’ alleged failure to address Johnson’s condition after the fracture.