Seti v. Robertson

Background

Ta Seti, a California prisoner representing himself, sued officials at Pelican Bay State Prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The remaining defendants were Warden Jim Robertson, Sergeant Silva, Chief Deputy Warden R. Bell, and Associate Wardens K. Osborne, A. Pepiot, D. Barneburg, C. Parry, and T. Lemos.

Ta Seti challenged three strip searches conducted during building-wide searches on November 6, November 28, and December 30, 2022. He alleged that the searches required prisoners to expose themselves in view of other inmates and, during two searches, female officers. He also alleged that the cells lacked privacy barriers around the toilets, allowing other prisoners to see inmates using the toilets and creating conditions that encouraged sexual harassment, coercion, and assault.

Ta Seti asserted claims under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the Prison Rape Elimination Act, California regulations, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Department Operations Manual, and California Assembly Bill 550. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows that a trial is necessary because a reasonable jury could find for the opposing party.

Eighth Amendment safety claim

The court analyzed whether the defendants failed to protect Ta Seti from harm by other prisoners. Such a claim requires evidence that the alleged deprivation was objectively serious and that officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety.

The court concluded that the record did not create a triable issue on either requirement. Regarding the strip searches, the court found that other inmates could potentially see Ta Seti and that the searches may have been followed by sexually explicit comments or banter. But the court held that the evidence did not show an objectively serious Eighth Amendment safety risk. It also held that the evidence did not show the defendants were deliberately indifferent to such a risk. The searches were part of mass building-wide searches, and the evidence showed that staffing and security concerns made it impossible to move every inmate to a private location.

Regarding the missing privacy barriers, the court held that Ta Seti’s evidence of unspecified “unwanted sexual encounters” with a former cellmate did not establish that the encounters were caused by being seen while using the toilet. The record did not show that other prisoners had been sexually assaulted by cellmates for that reason. The court further found no evidence that the defendants knew the lack of barriers created a risk of sexual assault against Ta Seti. The defendants presented unrebutted evidence that barriers would create areas officers could not see from outside the cells and would create safety and security risks.

Fourth Amendment strip-search claim

The court held that the searches were reasonable in the prison setting. The searches were visual and did not involve touching. Ta Seti was housed in the prison’s highest-security general-population unit. The female officers did not conduct the searches; the evidence showed only incidental viewing during two of the searches. The court also noted that the searches occurred three times over two months and took place in or at the entrance to Ta Seti’s cell, making them less public than the searches discussed in the cases he cited.

The court concluded that the evidence did not show that the searches were an exaggerated or excessive means of enforcing prison security. It also found no evidence that female officers regularly or frequently observed Ta Seti while he was unclothed or did so without a legitimate reason.

Eighth Amendment strip-search claim

The court applied the higher Eighth Amendment standard, which requires an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Because the searches did not involve touching, cross-gender searches were permitted only in emergencies, and the Fourth Amendment analysis found no unreasonable search, the court held that the searches did not meet this higher standard.

Prison Rape Elimination Act and state-law claims

The court held that the Prison Rape Elimination Act does not create a private right of action that Ta Seti could enforce through § 1983. It also held that § 1983 does not impose liability for violations of state law and that Ta Seti identified no authority establishing a private right to sue for violations of the Department Operations Manual or the cited California regulations and assembly bill.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The order stated that the motion was granted and that the order disposed of the motion identified in the conclusion as Docket No. 27.