Barton v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Julie Ann Barton sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision denying her benefits. On October 4, 2022, the court granted the parties’ stipulation to remand the case for further proceedings. After the remand, the Commissioner granted Barton’s application and awarded her $59,317.98 in retroactive benefits.

Barton had agreed to pay her attorney, Robert C. Weems, up to 25% of her past-due benefits under a contingent-fee agreement. That maximum would have been $14,829.50. Weems requested $2,965.90 under § 406(b) of the Social Security Act.

Legal standard

Section 406(b) permits a federal court that enters a judgment favorable to a Social Security claimant represented by an attorney to award the attorney a reasonable fee of no more than 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. The court must independently review the fee request for reasonableness, beginning with the contingent-fee agreement and considering the quality of the representation, the result achieved, the time spent, and whether the fee should be reduced because of poor performance, delay, or an amount disproportionate to the work performed.

A fee awarded under § 406(b) is paid from the claimant’s past-due benefits. If the attorney also receives fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the attorney must refund the smaller fee to the claimant. The court stated that the government had paid no Equal Access to Justice Act fees in this case.

Court’s analysis

The court found that Weems had shown the requested fee was reasonable. The contingent-fee agreement was consistent with the 25% statutory limit. The court found no evidence of substandard performance and noted that Weems’s representation resulted in Barton receiving $59,317.98 in past-due benefits.

Weems reported that his customary non-contingency rate was $500 per hour and submitted an invoice showing 3.5 hours of work. The requested fee produced an effective hourly rate of $847.40. Although that rate was higher than his customary rate, the court explained that contingency-fee cases involve a risk of nonpayment and that courts generally defer to a successful lawyer’s professional judgment about the time required. The court also cited decisions approving comparable or higher effective hourly rates in Social Security cases.

Disposition

The court granted counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. It directed the Commissioner to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $2,965.90, payable to Robert C. Weems.