Barton v. Colvin

Background

Lenore Barton applied for disability benefits, but her application was denied initially, on reconsideration, after an administrative hearing, and by the Appeals Council. She then filed an action for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court found in her favor and remanded the case for further proceedings. After remand, the Commissioner approved Barton’s application and awarded her $69,735 in past-due benefits.

Barton had agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits resulting from a favorable disability decision. The Commissioner set aside $17,433.75 for attorney fees. Barton’s attorney, Katherine Siegfried, requested that amount under § 406(b) of the Social Security Act. The court had previously approved $9,800 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, or EAJA, a separate statute that permits fee awards paid by the government in qualifying cases.

Legal Standard

Section 406(b) permits a federal court that enters a favorable judgment for a claimant represented by an attorney to award a reasonable fee, subject to a limit of 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. The attorney must show that the requested fee is reasonable, and the court must independently review the request. The court first considers the contingency-fee agreement and then evaluates the quality of the representation, the result obtained, any delay, and whether the fee is disproportionate to the time spent.

When both EAJA fees and § 406(b) fees are awarded, the attorney generally must refund the smaller amount to the claimant so the claimant receives the full amount of past-due benefits. The court stated that the EAJA award in this case had been garnished to recover a federal debt. It therefore found that the § 406(b) fee was not subject to reduction by the EAJA award.

Court’s Analysis

The court found that Siegfried met her burden of showing that the requested fee was reasonable. The 25% fee matched the statutory limit and Barton’s contingency-fee agreement. The court found no evidence of substandard performance; instead, the representation resulted in Barton receiving $69,735 in past-due benefits.

Siegfried stated that her current non-contingency hourly rate for appellate cases unrelated to Social Security was $500. She reported spending 47.3 hours on Barton’s case, resulting in an effective hourly rate of $369. The court also considered that contingency-fee representation involves risk and that the effective hourly rate was within rates approved in other cases.

Disposition

Judge Robert M. Illman granted counsel’s motion for attorney fees. The Commissioner was directed to certify $17,433.75 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), payable to Katherine Siegfried. The award is to be paid from Barton’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy, to the extent those benefits are available and were not used to pay an attorney fee under § 406(a).