Banshu v. Edouard

Background

Kahusia Jhuty Banshu, who was proceeding without a lawyer, sued two members of the New York City Police Department Transit Bureau District 3 and two employees of the New York City Administration for Children’s Services. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction and alleged violations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments and “Art. VI S. 11.” The court had previously allowed him to proceed without prepaying filing fees.

Banshu’s amended complaint concerned events in February 2024. He alleged that Sergeant Willem questioned his fifteen-year-old daughter after she ran away following an argument with him, had her complete and sign a statement, and later arranged for her to be taken home. Banshu characterized the questioning and statement as coercive and fabricated. He also alleged that Lieutenant Toussaint recorded his identification information and referred the matter to ACS, and that ACS workers later came to his residence. Banshu claimed that the referral was retaliatory because he had threatened to sue Toussaint. He sought injunctive relief and money damages.

The complaint also described a 2018 incident involving police and social workers. The court stated that it was not addressing that incident, which appeared to be included as context for the February 2024 claims, and that nothing in the order prohibited Banshu from pursuing related federal and state-law claims in the appropriate courts.

Claims on Behalf of the Minor Daughter

The court dismissed without prejudice any claims Banshu was asserting on behalf of his minor daughter. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and Second Circuit precedent, a nonlawyer parent generally cannot represent a child’s interests in federal court without a lawyer. The opinion does not state that Banshu was an attorney.

Claims Under Section 1983

The court construed Banshu’s claims against the police and ACS employees as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides a remedy when a person acting under state authority violates a right protected by the Constitution or federal law.

Family integrity. The court considered whether questioning Banshu’s daughter without his consent and referring the matter to ACS violated his constitutional right to family integrity. The court explained that parents have a protected liberty interest in caring for, having custody of, and managing their children, but that this interest does not automatically override the government’s interest in protecting children.

The court held that Banshu had not alleged facts showing conduct sufficiently shocking, arbitrary, or extreme to violate substantive due process. It also emphasized that he did not allege that he lost custody of his daughter because of the defendants’ actions. The court further concluded that the alleged questioning did not violate his liberty interest and that a parent has no right to be free from an ACS investigation. The family-integrity claim was therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Retaliation. The court also dismissed Banshu’s First Amendment retaliation claim for failure to state a claim. Although Banshu alleged that he texted Toussaint threatening to sue, the complaint did not show that the ACS referral was made because of those messages or that the defendants’ actions chilled his exercise of a First Amendment right. The court observed that the allegations instead indicated that the messages followed the referral.

State-Law Claims

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is the federal court’s discretionary authority to hear related state-law claims when federal claims are also before it. The court concluded that the federal claims had been dismissed at an early stage and that the remaining state-law claims should not be decided in this case.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court denied leave to amend because it determined that the defects in the complaint could not be cured by amendment. It dismissed the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), terminated all other pending matters, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Fee-free status was therefore denied for purposes of an appeal.