Calonge v. City Of San Jose

Background

Francis Calonge was shot and killed by San Jose police Officer Edward Carboni on October 31, 2019. Rosalina Calonge, Francis’s mother, sued on her own behalf and as Francis’s successor-in-interest. The remaining state-law claims were for wrongful death, violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, battery, and violation of the California Public Records Act (CPRA).

The defendants, the City of San Jose and Officer Carboni, moved for summary judgment on the state-law claims. Summary judgment is a ruling without a trial that is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Rosalina moved for partial summary judgment on her CPRA claim.

In an earlier ruling, the court granted the defendants summary judgment on some federal claims, found Officer Carboni entitled to qualified immunity, and dismissed the state-law claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit later reversed the summary judgment ruling on the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims, and affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the Fourteenth Amendment claim. After the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate, the parties renewed their motions on the state-law claims.

Wrongful Death, Battery, and Bane Act Claims

The parties agreed that the wrongful-death, battery, and Bane Act claims should proceed to a jury trial. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all three claims.

Under California law, the wrongful-death claim requires proof of negligence, including a duty of care, a breach, and causation. California battery requires an intentional harmful or offensive touching without consent that caused harm or offense. The court explained that these claims, as alleged, require unreasonable force and use the same objective-reasonableness standard applied to Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims.

The Ninth Circuit had determined that a reasonable jury could find that Officer Carboni violated the Fourth Amendment because the total circumstances did not justify deadly force at the summary-judgment stage. The district court therefore concluded that the defendants could not show they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the wrongful-death and battery claims.

The Bane Act creates a claim when a person interferes, through threat, intimidation, or coercion, with rights protected by the United States Constitution or federal law. The court stated that a Bane Act claim may be based on the constitutional violation itself without a separate showing of threat, intimidation, or coercion, but it also requires specific intent to violate the person’s rights. Because the Ninth Circuit had determined that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the court denied summary judgment on the Bane Act claim as based on that alleged violation. The parties agreed that the Bane Act claim would proceed only on the Fourth Amendment theory, not the Fourteenth Amendment theory.

California Public Records Act Claim

The defendants argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the CPRA claim or should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s authority to hear a related state-law claim alongside a federal claim. The court had previously concluded that the CPRA claim arose from the same case or controversy as the federal claim and that it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

The court nevertheless decided to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (4). It found that the CPRA claim presented novel and complex issues of California law. The defendants had not produced 85 videos that might respond to Rosalina’s request, and the parties disputed whether the CPRA provides a claim based on the timing of production, whether delayed production can amount to denial, and whether Rosalina had to narrow her request by consulting an index prepared by the defendants. The court also found that expedited state-court procedures could likely resolve the issue faster.

The court denied both the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Rosalina’s motion for partial summary judgment on the CPRA claim. It dismissed the CPRA claim without prejudice to refiling in state court.

Disposition

Judge Nathanael Cousins denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Third Claim for wrongful death, Fourth Claim for violation of the Bane Act, Sixth Claim for battery, and Seventh Claim under the CPRA. He also denied Rosalina’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Seventh Claim. The Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, wrongful-death claim, Bane Act claim, and battery claim will proceed to trial. The CPRA claim was dismissed without prejudice.