J.P. v. County of Alameda

Background

J.P., acting through guardian ad litem Shannon Villanueva, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for constitutional violations by persons acting under state law. The claims were against Alameda County, County employees Diane Davis Maas and Sue May, and Triad. J.P. asserted First and Fourteenth Amendment claims and a California negligence claim.

The Ninth Circuit had held that the individual County defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claims based on state-created-danger and special-relationship theories because the law was not clearly established. It also held that siblings have no viable First Amendment claim based on loss of familial association. After the Supreme Court denied J.P.’s petition for review, the parties disputed what claims remained.

County Claims

The court dismissed the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the individual County defendants. It also dismissed the Monell claims—claims seeking to hold a local government responsible for an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom—to the extent they were based on the First Amendment.

The court did not dismiss the Monell claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment. It explained that the Ninth Circuit had resolved the qualified-immunity issue by finding no clearly established law, but had not decided that no Fourteenth Amendment violation could have occurred. Because an individual official may receive qualified immunity even though a constitutional violation may have occurred, the Fourteenth Amendment Monell claims against the County remained pending.

Triad’s Summary-Judgment Motion

Triad sought summary judgment, which is a ruling entered when no genuine dispute about a material fact requires a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Triad argued that it was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 and that J.P. could not recover emotional-distress damages under his negligence claim.

The court denied summary judgment on the Monell claims. It found a genuine factual issue concerning whether Triad performed governmental functions under its agreement with the County. The agreement assigned Triad duties that included reporting significant incidents involving foster children and moving children between certified foster homes when there was an imminent risk. The court concluded that Triad might qualify as a state actor under the public-function test, so the other state-action tests did not need to be considered.

The court granted summary judgment on the negligence claim. Under California law, negligent infliction of emotional distress is not a separate tort but a way of seeking emotional-distress damages through a negligence claim. The court ruled that J.P. could not recover as a direct victim because the alleged negligence involved Triad’s supervision of M.M., not a breach of a duty directly causing J.P.’s distress. It also ruled that J.P. could not recover as a bystander because he did not observe M.M. ingest the methamphetamine or otherwise contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event and its connection to her harm.

Disposition

The motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The negligence cause of action was dismissed. The only claims remaining were the Fourteenth Amendment Monell claims against the County and Triad. The court also granted the motion to seal, but stated that the ruling did not mean the material would necessarily remain sealed at trial. It set December 10, 2021, as a compliance deadline and required the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed schedule for the remaining claims.