Colson v. Mingo

Background

Ronald E. Colson alleged that on August 30, 2016, he and other incarcerated people were transported from the Manhattan Detention Complex to Rikers Island. The receiving facilities would not admit them, and the sending facility would not take them back. The passengers remained on the bus overnight without food, water, or bathroom access. They were directed to use the back of the bus as a toilet, and Colson testified that the resulting odor caused passengers to vomit. The bus also contained broken glass, and Colson said that his handcuffs were excessively tight.

The next morning, Emergency Services Unit personnel entered the bus after passengers refused to leave. Officers deployed oleoresin capsicum, or pepper spray, while the passengers were handcuffed. Colson testified that he was sprayed twice, including once for what felt like 30 seconds, and that he experienced burning skin, dizziness, and headaches.

Colson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, claiming unconstitutional conditions of confinement, excessive force, and municipal liability by the City of New York. The defendants sought dismissal of the claims against Enjoli Lake and Munish Chopra as untimely and sought summary judgment on the remaining claims. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial that is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome.

Claims Against Lake and Chopra

The court denied the motion to dismiss the claims against Lake and Chopra as untimely. Section 1983 claims filed in New York generally have a three-year limitations period, and the claims arose from events in August 2016. Colson added Lake and Chopra after that period had expired, but the court held that the amendments related back to his original complaint.

As to Lake, the original complaint identified the relevant supervising officer as Captain Williams and described the officer’s alleged role in ordering the bus to remain overnight. The court found that the City’s attorney reasonably should have recognized that Colson had mistakenly identified the tour commander and that Lake was the intended defendant. The court also found that Lake had adequate notice and would not be unfairly prejudiced.

As to Chopra, the original complaint identified one of the bus drivers as a John Doe and described the driver’s role. The court found that Colson exercised reasonable diligence because he relied on information from the defendants that initially misidentified the driver, and the defendants later identified Chopra. The claims against Chopra therefore related back under the applicable federal and New York rules.

Conditions of Confinement

The court held that genuine factual disputes remained about whether Lake, Chopra, Cedric Carter, and Kevin Anderson were personally involved in unconstitutional conditions and acted with deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference means knowing about a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarding that risk.

The evidence could support a finding that Lake knew about the bus’s situation and ordered or allowed it to remain overnight. A jury could also find that Carter and Anderson observed the buildup of urine, feces, and vomit and failed to provide food, water, or bathroom access. Although Chopra tried to find a receiving facility and asked whether the passengers could return to the Manhattan Detention Complex, the court found a factual dispute about whether he disregarded the passengers’ repeated requests for basic necessities during his shift.

The court also denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from damages in some circumstances, but the court held that the factual disputes prevented resolving that issue at the summary-judgment stage.

Excessive Force

The court denied summary judgment on the excessive-force claims against Maxsolaine Mingo, Walter Ross, Edwin Lopera, Mark Daniels, Daniel Ortiz, and Alason Henry. A jury could find that Mingo knew the passengers were handcuffed and not resisting and nevertheless ordered or knew about the use of chemical spray. The record also contained conflicting evidence about whether passengers threatened officers or themselves with broken glass.

Ross and Lopera were present when the spray was used. The court held that a jury could find they knew the spray was excessive and had a realistic opportunity to intervene. Daniels was identified in the defendants’ factual statement as having ordered the spray, while Ortiz and Henry admitted deploying it. The court found factual disputes about the amount of force used, the passengers’ level of resistance, and whether the officers’ actions were justified.

Claims Against the City

The court granted summary judgment to the City on Colson’s municipal-liability claims. Under the municipal-liability rule recognized in Monell v. Department of Social Services, a city may be liable when an official policy, custom, or inadequate training or supervision causes a constitutional violation.

For the conditions claim, the court found that the City’s written policy required incarcerated people to be housed at the receiving facility within a stated time and did not authorize keeping them overnight on transfer buses without basic necessities. Although evidence suggested that overnight bus detention was common, Colson did not provide evidence that the other detainees in those instances were denied necessities in the same way. The court therefore found insufficient evidence of a widespread unconstitutional practice.

For the excessive-force claim, Colson relied on several earlier incidents involving alleged excessive force or inaccurate use-of-force reports. The court found that the incidents were insufficient to establish a widespread practice. It also found that Colson offered no adequate evidence of deficient training, a causal connection between training and the alleged violation, or a final policymaker’s knowledge of and failure to address a need for better supervision.

Sealing and Trial-Related Requests

The court granted in part Colson’s motion to unseal documents filed in connection with the motions. The court ordered public versions of most filings and exhibits, while requiring certain documents to remain sealed or to be redacted only concerning privileged law-enforcement procedures and techniques. The court rejected broader redactions for disciplinary records because the defendants had not shown that disclosure would threaten officer safety or interfere with an investigation.

The court also granted Colson’s motion to attend a possible trial in civilian clothing and without handcuffs or other restraints.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against Lake and Chopra as untimely was DENIED. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning the individual defendants was DENIED. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment concerning Colson’s municipal-liability claims against the City was GRANTED. Colson’s motion to unseal documents was GRANTED IN PART, and his motion to attend a possible trial without civilian-clothing or restraint restrictions was GRANTED.