Berry v. Hennepin County

Background

Seven individual plaintiffs formerly lived in homeless encampments in Minneapolis public parks during 2020. ZACAH, a nonprofit organization staffed by unpaid volunteers, also sued. The plaintiffs alleged that Hennepin County, Hennepin County Sheriff Dawanna Witt in her official capacity, the City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Police Chief Brian O’Hara in his official capacity, the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board (MPRB), and unidentified police officers closed encampments without sufficient notice and destroyed residents’ personal property.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted five counts: unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution; a related privacy claim; procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution; conversion under Minnesota law; and federal and state conspiracy claims. The plaintiffs sought damages, attorney’s fees, declaratory relief, and an injunction. The court had previously denied class certification, limiting the case to locations where the individual plaintiffs allegedly camped and lost property, and to encampment closures allegedly connected to ZACAH’s expenditures.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on all claims against the MPRB and partial summary judgment on their conspiracy claim against the Hennepin County and City defendants. The defendants also moved to exclude two expert witnesses.

Standing and Traceability

The court held that no individual plaintiff currently lived in a homeless encampment and that the possibility of becoming homeless, choosing to live in an encampment, and suffering another property loss was too speculative to support injunctive or declaratory relief. ZACAH likewise lacked standing for those forms of relief because the alleged encampment-related expenditures were in the past and there was no evidence that regular encampment closures continued.

Roy and Westvig lacked standing to seek damages because they did not allege that a defendant destroyed their property. Roy’s property was gone after she stayed elsewhere, but she did not allege that a defendant took or destroyed it during an encampment closure. Westvig left the parks with his property before any closure and was never present when an encampment was cleared.

ZACAH also lacked organizational standing. The court found no evidence that its hotel expenditures significantly drained its resources or were traceable to the alleged seizure and destruction of property. The evidence showed that ZACAH funded hotel stays because encampments were closing and residents needed somewhere to go, not because defendants had destroyed their property.

The court further held that the plaintiffs had not shown that their alleged injuries were traceable to Hennepin County. None of the seven remaining locations at issue was on County property, and the record did not show that the County was responsible for disbanding those encampments or destroying property. The City defendants were also entitled to summary judgment because the record did not show that City employees participated in seizing or destroying the plaintiffs’ property. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretations of evidence concerning police perimeters, interagency cooperation, and Commander Grant Snyder’s body-camera footage.

Unserved Defendants

The unidentified John and Jane Doe police officers were not identified during discovery and were not served within the time required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The plaintiffs conceded that these defendants had not been identified and should be dismissed without prejudice.

Fourth Amendment Claims

The court held that five plaintiffs—Berry, Brown, Little, Barrow, and Huiting—experienced a seizure of property for purposes of the motions. But the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ expectations of privacy in some property were not objectively reasonable. Little left damaged property unattended at Kenwood Park before the closure, and Huiting left property unattended at Riverside Park for two days after learning that the encampment would close. The MPRB was entitled to treat that property as abandoned, so defendants received summary judgment on those Fourth Amendment claims.

The court found a possible factual issue concerning whether Huiting abandoned property at Matthews Park after leaving for only a few hours. It nevertheless held that the plaintiffs’ municipal-liability theory failed. Because the defendants were municipal entities or officials sued in their official capacities, the plaintiffs had to show that a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

The plaintiffs argued that MPRB Resolution 2020-267 was an unconstitutional policy because it allowed encampment closures without specifying procedures for notice, property storage, or property destruction. The court rejected that argument, finding that the resolution did not authorize the seizure or destruction of property. The court treated the plaintiffs’ theory instead as a challenge to an alleged unofficial custom of giving insufficient notice and destroying property.

The court held that the record did not show a widespread and longstanding custom. Powderhorn Park West was only the second encampment closed under the resolution, and the MPRB could not have been on notice of an unconstitutional custom at that point. Peavey Park was the seventh closure, but the plaintiffs had not shown that the alleged insufficient notice there reflected a widespread practice with the force of law. The court therefore granted judgment to defendants on the Fourth Amendment claim.

Procedural Due Process

The court assumed, for purposes of the motions, that the plaintiffs had a protected property interest. It explained that procedural due process concerns whether the government used constitutionally adequate procedures, not whether the underlying deprivation was substantively justified.

Barrow received more than twenty-four hours’ notice that Powderhorn Park West would close and chose not to leave. Huiting received notice before the Matthews Park closure and also knew Riverside Park would close, but did not move his property. The court held that neither had a procedural due-process claim. Although Brown and Berry claimed they received no advance notice, the court found evidence that the MPRB gave some notice at both Peavey Park and Powderhorn Park West. It also found that available post-deprivation remedies, including an MPRB administrative claim process and the plaintiffs’ conversion claim, supported judgment for defendants.

The court further held that the MPRB’s decisions about the timing and form of notice were reasonable in light of the circumstances, including employee-safety concerns during the Peavey Park closure, the burden of storing property, and evidence that the MPRB offered transportation and assistance moving belongings at some locations. Defendants therefore received summary judgment on the procedural-due-process claim.

State Constitutional and Conversion Claims

The court stated that Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state constitutional rights and that Minnesota does not recognize the asserted private remedies for the Minnesota constitutional claims. Because the plaintiffs did not address that argument, the court dismissed those claims.

The court also granted summary judgment on the conversion claim. Minnesota conversion requires willful interference with another person’s property without lawful justification. The court held that the plaintiffs did not have permission to store their belongings in Minneapolis public parks, that the relevant encampments were unpermitted when they were closed, and that the MPRB was legally justified in interfering with property left there.

Conspiracy Claims

The court held that the constitutional conspiracy claim failed because the plaintiffs had not established an underlying constitutional violation. It also held that, even assuming a violation, the evidence did not show a meeting of the minds to seize and destroy property in violation of constitutional rights. Evidence that defendants coordinated encampment closures did not establish an agreement to violate property rights. The state-law conspiracy-to-convert claim failed for the same reasons.

Expert Motions

The court granted the motion to exclude Dr. Zack Almquist because his opinions concerned class-certification issues and the plaintiffs no longer intended to offer him as an expert. The court denied as moot the motion to exclude Professor Chris Herring because summary judgment resolved the plaintiffs’ claims. The court stated that, if his testimony were not moot, it would exclude it under Evidence Rule 702 because the opinions relied on unsupported “guidelines,” did not adequately distinguish among defendants, and were not sufficiently helpful or reliable.

Disposition

The court ordered the following:

- The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment was denied. - The motion to exclude Dr. Almquist was granted. - The motion to exclude Professor Herring was denied as moot. - The defendants’ motions for summary judgment were granted. - The plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. - Westvig’s, Roy’s, and ZACAH’s claims were dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. - The claims against the City defendants and Hennepin County defendants were dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. - The claims against the John and Jane Doe police officers were dismissed without prejudice under Rule 4(m). - The plaintiffs’ remaining claims were dismissed with prejudice.

The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.