Pronk v. City of Rochester

Background

Curtis Pronk worked for the City of Rochester’s Fire Department as an Administrative Service Manager. His duties included budgeting, facilities management, and finance payments. Over time, he also had supervisory responsibilities, although those responsibilities were not part of his job description. His supervisors generally rated his performance as successful from 2011 through 2020, although a 2020 alternative review criticized his initiative, understanding of his duties, and leadership of the department.

In 2021, the Fire Department reassigned supervision of administrative assistants away from Pronk and reclassified his position. The new position had reduced responsibilities and was assigned a lower pay grade. His annual salary decreased from $128,086 to $116,213. Pronk retained some committee and board roles but no longer attended certain command-staff meetings. He retired on August 31, 2021, at age 60. After his retirement, the department changed the position into an Administrative Service Coordinator role, which retained most of the prior position’s duties and added some duties and supervisory responsibilities. Another individual, age 50, was hired for that role.

Claims and Motion

Pronk sued the City of Rochester, Erik Kerska, Vance Swisher, and Linda Hillenbrand. He alleged age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act; age-based equal-protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; procedural due-process violations; a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights; and municipal liability based on a City policy, custom, or practice. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks the court to rule for a party when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could change the result.

Age-Discrimination Claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination. It held that Pronk did not establish the required initial showing because he could not prove constructive discharge. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately creates working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would view quitting as the only plausible choice, and the employer intended the employee to quit or could reasonably foresee the resignation.

The court held that criticism of Pronk’s work, removal of supervisory duties, changes to his job description, and the $11,873 annual pay reduction did not make his working conditions objectively intolerable. The court also found no evidence that the defendants intended or expected Pronk to retire. In addition, Pronk did not give the defendants a reasonable opportunity to address his alleged age-discrimination concerns before retiring. The court noted that Minnesota law does not impose that notice requirement for a disparate-treatment constructive-discharge claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, but concluded that Pronk’s Minnesota claim still failed because he could not show objectively intolerable conditions or a foreseeable resignation.

The court further held that, even if Pronk had established an initial case of discrimination, he could not show that the defendants’ stated reasons for reclassifying his position were a pretext, meaning a cover for discrimination. The court rejected his reliance on earlier positive reviews, alleged policy violations, alleged age stereotyping, the use of the nickname “Richard,” and allegedly changing explanations for the reclassification. The court also held that the hiring of a younger person after Pronk’s retirement was insufficient by itself to support an inference that age was the decisive cause of the reclassification or discharge.

Procedural Due Process Claim

The court held that Pronk had a protected property interest in his job because the collective bargaining agreement stated that employees could not be terminated except for just cause. But the court found that Pronk did not show he was deprived of that interest without adequate notice and an opportunity to object. Both unions involved had grievance procedures, and Pronk did not follow them. The court therefore held that he waived any procedural due-process claim by retiring and declining to participate in available post-termination administrative or grievance procedures. The court also reiterated that he had not shown constructive discharge.

Conspiracy Claim

The court granted summary judgment on the conspiracy claim because Pronk did not establish an underlying constitutional violation or specific facts showing a meeting of the minds among Kerska, Swisher, and Hillenbrand.

Municipal-Liability Claim

The court also granted summary judgment to the City on Pronk’s municipal-liability claim. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 when an unconstitutional act results from an official policy or established custom. The court held that Pronk had not shown an underlying constitutional violation and had not presented evidence of a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by City employees.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and ordered that judgment be entered accordingly. The order was signed by Michael J. Davis on January 21, 2025.