Imhof v. New York CIty Housing Authority

Background

John Imhof’s amended complaint asserts claims against the New York City Housing Authority, Daniel Sherrod, Richard Morrison, and Andrew Lupin under the Americans with Disabilities Act and related New York laws. The complaint concerns Imhof’s requests for reasonable accommodations and alleged delays in responding to those requests.

Defendants moved to disqualify Imhof’s counsel, Walker J. Harman Jr., and his firm, Harman Green. Before the motion was decided, the court stayed discovery. Defendants argued that Harman was a necessary and indispensable fact witness because he had communicated with Lupin about Imhof’s accommodation request and threatened claims against the Housing Authority. They also argued that Harman had a conflict of interest because his personal interests could adversely affect his professional judgment for Imhof.

Lawyer-as-Witness Rule

The court explained that motions to disqualify counsel are disfavored and require a high level of proof because they affect a client’s choice of lawyer, can delay litigation, and can increase expenses. New York’s lawyer-as-witness rule generally bars a lawyer from acting as an advocate in a matter if the lawyer is likely to testify about an important factual issue, subject to listed exceptions. To obtain disqualification under that rule, Defendants had to show that Harman’s testimony was necessary and that it was substantially likely to harm Imhof’s interests.

The court denied disqualification under this rule. It found that the allegations concerning Lupin’s role in later accommodation decisions generally did not involve Harman’s personal knowledge. The only identified interaction between Lupin and Harman was an email stating that Imhof’s accommodation request had been granted. Based on Lupin’s declaration, the court viewed that fact as apparently undisputed. The court also noted that Lupin himself could testify about the email, so Harman was not the only person with relevant knowledge. Defendants therefore did not meet their burden at that stage.

Conflict-of-Interest Rule

The court also denied disqualification under New York’s current-client conflict rule. Defendants argued that Harman’s interest in testifying truthfully about his communications with Lupin conflicted with Imhof’s interest in pursuing claims against Lupin. They also relied on Harman’s request that Defendants withdraw the motion in exchange for removing Lupin from the case.

The court found these conflict allegations conclusory. In particular, Defendants did not adequately identify what truthful testimony Harman would give or explain why that testimony could not support Imhof’s claims. The court concluded that Defendants had not met the heightened burden required for disqualification under the conflict-of-interest rule.

Disposition

The court denied Defendants’ motion to disqualify Imhof’s counsel and Harman Green. It ordered the parties to resume discovery. The order addressed counsel disqualification and discovery; it did not decide the merits of Imhof’s disability-discrimination claims.