Schoenadel v. YouGov America, Inc.

Background

Tracy Schoenadel was an executive at YouGov America Inc. She alleged that YouGov passed her over for a promotion, denied her compensation, reduced her responsibilities, and treated her worse because of her gender. She also alleged that the treatment worsened after she complained about bias, eventually forcing her to resign. Her claims arose under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the New York Labor Law.

Schoenadel sought, among other things, the position of chief executive officer of the Americas but YouGov gave that position to Ray Martin. YouGov later appointed Schoenadel chief customer officer, but she said responsibilities promised to her were taken away and assigned to men. She complained about possible bias in July and November 2021 and filed a formal internal grievance alleging gender discrimination in December 2021. She resigned in March 2022 while YouGov’s investigation was still pending.

The parties disputed Schoenadel’s compensation arrangements. YouGov said bonuses were discretionary or only potential commissions. Schoenadel said she had an agreement for a sports bonus equal to 2% of the sports profit-and-loss margin. YouGov also awarded her half of the long-term incentive award for which she was eligible. YouGov argued that her claims failed as a matter of law and separately moved to strike portions of declarations, exhibits, and her factual statement.

Motion to Strike

The court denied YouGov’s motion to strike. It explained that evidence submitted at summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge, avoid inadmissible hearsay, and be supported rather than merely conclusory or argumentative. The court disregarded portions it considered inappropriate and relied on admissible evidence, but did not strike the challenged materials in the manner requested by YouGov.

Discrimination Claims

The court denied summary judgment on Schoenadel’s Title VII gender-discrimination claim. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Applying the burden-shifting framework commonly used for discrimination claims, the court considered whether Schoenadel had evidence of an adverse employment action and whether YouGov’s stated performance-based reasons could be a pretext for discrimination.

The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, which rejected a requirement that an employment action cause significant, material, or serious harm. The court held that factual disputes existed about whether the reduction of Schoenadel’s responsibilities, loss of bonus payments, denial of the promotion, and other actions were adverse employment actions.

The court also held that Schoenadel presented enough evidence to create a jury question about constructive discharge. Constructive discharge occurs when an employer intentionally creates working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. Schoenadel testified that she was singled out for criticism, denied compensation, excluded from meetings, deprived of promised responsibilities, and told that the chief financial officer hated her and wanted to get her fired. The court said a reasonable juror could consider these circumstances together and decide whether they forced her resignation.

The court further found a genuine dispute about whether YouGov’s performance explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Among the evidence was the use of the nickname “Mama Fratelli,” which a jury could view as reflecting gender bias toward Schoenadel, a gay woman in a male-dominated field. The court also considered evidence that other women had raised concerns about being passed over for promotions or held to higher standards. YouGov argued that some of the same people who later took adverse actions had previously hired, promoted, or increased Schoenadel’s compensation. The court held that, even if that circumstance supported an inference against discrimination, Schoenadel presented enough evidence to rebut it.

The court denied summary judgment on the related New York State and New York City gender-discrimination claims for the same reasons. It stated that those laws use standards similar to, or more protective than, the federal standard applied here.

Retaliation Claims

The court denied summary judgment on Schoenadel’s Title VII retaliation claim. The court found no dispute that Schoenadel engaged in protected activity by complaining about possible gender bias and that YouGov knew about those complaints. The disputed issues were whether YouGov took an adverse action and whether the complaints caused that action.

For retaliation, an adverse action is one that could dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination complaint. The court held that a jury could view Schoenadel’s alleged exclusion from leadership meetings, increased isolation, lack of communication from senior leaders, and ignored requests for information collectively as retaliation. The court also noted that constructive discharge could qualify as an adverse action.

The court found a factual dispute about causation because Schoenadel identified several stages of protected activity, including her July 2021 email, her November 2021 complaint to management and human resources, and her December 2021 formal grievance. Although some exclusion began before the later complaints, she argued that the exclusion and isolation worsened after her complaints. The court held that a reasonable jury could consider that evidence in deciding whether retaliation was a but-for cause of the adverse actions.

The related New York State and New York City retaliation claims also survived. The court stated that the New York State standard is governed by the same general standards as the federal claim and that the city law uses a similar, and in some respects more permissive, standard.

New York Wage Claim

The court denied summary judgment on Schoenadel’s New York Labor Law claim concerning unpaid compensation. Schoenadel conceded that she was not a “commission salesperson” under the statutory provision governing payment frequency, but argued that YouGov unlawfully deducted her sports bonus from wages under a separate provision barring certain wage deductions.

The court held that the key issue was whether Schoenadel had an enforceable contractual right to the sports bonus. Schoenadel submitted evidence, including a message exchange in which Chahal said that Saez had described the bonus as contractual rather than discretionary. Because that evidence created a genuine factual dispute, the court allowed the wage claim to proceed. The court also treated YouGov’s argument that the bonus did not qualify as wages as waived because YouGov raised it for the first time during oral argument rather than in its summary-judgment papers.

Punitive Damages and After-Acquired Evidence

The court deferred the question of punitive damages until trial. Punitive damages may be available when discrimination or retaliation is carried out with malice or reckless indifference to protected rights. The court said whether Schoenadel could meet that standard was factbound and could be addressed in YouGov’s motion made under Rule 50(a) before the close of evidence.

The court also denied summary judgment on YouGov’s after-acquired-evidence defense. YouGov argued that it would have fired Schoenadel based on evidence discovered after her resignation, including alleged retention of confidential documents and screenshots and the financial consequences of an agreement she signed without legal review. The court held that YouGov’s evidence did not establish as a matter of law that it would have terminated Schoenadel solely for that conduct. The credibility of YouGov’s witness and the absence of evidence about how other employees were disciplined created issues for later factfinding.

Disposition

Judge Arun Subramanian denied YouGov’s motion for summary judgment and denied its motion to strike. The court directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motions at Dockets 66 and 119.