Khan v. Madsen

Background

Muhammad Khan, who was a state prisoner when he filed this self-represented civil-rights action, sued prison staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged harassment, disciplinary actions based on allegedly false Rules Violation Reports, loss of good-conduct credits, placement in a special housing unit, and related conditions.

The court had previously dismissed Khan’s first amended complaint with leave to amend. After Khan did not timely file another amended complaint, the court dismissed the case and entered judgment. The court later reopened the matter after learning of Khan’s parole status and move out of state. Khan then filed two complaints called “Madsen I” and “Madsen II,” which the court screened under the prisoner-complaint screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Madsen I

The court dismissed with prejudice Khan’s claim against Warden Craig Koenig based on vicarious liability because § 1983 does not impose liability solely because a person is responsible for another person’s actions.

The court found that Khan adequately stated the following claims against Haley Madsen: retaliation for charging him with a false Rules Violation Report and destroying his property; a due-process claim concerning authorized confiscation of property; and a claim involving the free exercise of religion based on confiscation of religious material.

The court dismissed with prejudice Khan’s Fourth Amendment claim concerning a search of his prison cell, holding that a prisoner has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell. The court also dismissed with prejudice Khan’s due-process claim concerning his placement in the special housing unit because the complaint did not allege that Madsen was responsible for the placement or for failing to hold a hearing.

The court found sufficient allegations to allow retaliation and due-process claims against J. Reed, Jesus P. Bojorquez, and Jose Gonzales to proceed. These claims concerned disciplinary actions, alleged retaliation, and disciplinary hearings involving various charges. The court dismissed the claims against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Does 1 through 25 from this action because Khan stated no cause of action against them, and it terminated Koenig from the case.

Madsen II

The court dismissed Khan’s “Madsen II” claims without prejudice from this action because the claims were improperly joined under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18(a) and 20(a). Khan may pursue them in a separate action, but the court identified deficiencies that must be corrected.

For example, the court said Khan could pursue a claim against Roland Ramon concerning an allegedly restrictive jumpsuit in a separate action, but he needed to allege facts showing both a sufficiently serious deprivation and deliberate indifference. The court also said that a claim against Enrique Galvan concerning access to the courts needed allegations of actual injury. Claims against Raul Monroy concerning the prison grievance process could likewise be raised separately. The court found Khan’s proposed Eighth Amendment claim against Madsen concerning medical equipment conclusory and unnecessary because the property allegations were already addressed in “Madsen I,” and it did not grant leave to amend that claim. Khan could also attempt to pursue claims against Does 1 through 25 concerning conditions in the special housing unit, phone calls, and law-library access in a separate action, subject to the joinder requirements.

Disposition and case management

The action proceeds on nine categories of claims: three against Madsen, two against Reed, two against Bojorquez, and two against Gonzales. The order directed service on Madsen, Bojorquez, and Gonzales through the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s electronic service program. It required defendants to file a summary-judgment motion or another dispositive motion within 91 days after the order was filed, set deadlines for Khan’s opposition and defendants’ reply, and allowed discovery under the federal rules.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman did not decide the ultimate merits of the claims that survived screening. The order determined which claims were adequately pleaded for purposes of continuing in this action and which claims were dismissed or had to be brought separately.