Malberg v. Weiss

Background

Martin Malberg sued Erik P. Weiss and Karen K. Stromeyer. The opinion states that both sides were representing themselves. Malberg previously sued attorneys for his wife over an allegedly unconstitutional restraining order. In this case, he sued the attorneys who represented those attorneys in the earlier related case.

Malberg alleged that Weiss and Stromeyer violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by defending their clients. He also cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal criminal statutes concerning conspiracy to violate rights and seditious conspiracy. He sought criminal penalties, including maximum prison time, a criminal referral, and a grand-jury petition.

Rule 12(b)(6) standard

The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint must state enough facts to make a claim legally plausible. The court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and reads a self-represented plaintiff’s filings liberally, but self-represented litigants must still follow the procedural rules.

Section 1983 claims

The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not themselves provide a direct civil cause of action, so the court construed Malberg’s constitutional allegations as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege both a violation of a federal right and action taken under color of state law—meaning action fairly attributable to the state.

The court held that Malberg did not plausibly allege, and could not plausibly allege, that Weiss and Stromeyer acted under color of state law. Their status as California attorneys and officers of the court did not make them state actors. Nor did their use of court procedures or reliance on legal rules while representing clients satisfy the state-action requirement. The court therefore dismissed the § 1983 claim.

Federal criminal statutes

The court also dismissed Malberg’s attempt to invoke 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 2384 to obtain criminal penalties. It ruled that private individuals cannot bring civil claims based on those criminal statutes or seek criminal penalties through a private lawsuit. The court dismissed those claims for lack of standing.

State-law claims and jurisdiction

After dismissing all federal grounds identified in the complaint, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining unspecified or implied state-law claims, such as possible fraud or evidence-fabrication claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s discretionary authority to hear related state-law claims after federal claims are present. The court dismissed those state-law claims without prejudice to refiling them in state court.

The court also noted that a request for declaratory relief did not independently establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction because the Declaratory Judgment Act does not itself create that jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed, without leave to amend, claims purportedly arising from the First or Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 2384. It also dismissed any remaining unspecified or implied state-law claim without leave to amend and without prejudice to refiling in state court. The court found that amendment would be futile because private attorneys invoking legal procedures do not become state actors and private plaintiffs cannot bring criminal charges.