Thompson v. Runnels

Background

John William Thompson sought federal review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 of his state conviction for first-degree murder and personal use of a firearm. The state court sentenced him to 32 years to life in prison. His federal case was stayed for eight years while he pursued additional claims in state court. After the stay was lifted, Thompson filed a third amended habeas petition raising six claims involving actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Robert Burton moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. The court explained that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 generally gives state prisoners one year to file a federal habeas petition. Because Thompson’s conviction became final before that law took effect, the court determined that his filing deadline was April 24, 1997. Thompson’s federal petition was treated as filed on October 27, 2002 under the prison-mailbox rule, more than six years after the deadline.

Arguments About the Filing Deadline

Thompson argued that the deadline did not begin until 2006, when two witnesses allegedly recanted or qualified their trial testimony. The court rejected that argument. It held that the deadline runs from when the factual basis of a claim could have been discovered through reasonable diligence, not from when the petitioner later obtains evidence supporting facts already known.

Thompson also sought equitable tolling, which can extend a filing deadline when a petitioner diligently pursues his rights but an extraordinary circumstance prevents timely filing. He alleged that his mother hired attorney Russell Clanton in January 1997 to file a federal habeas petition, but Clanton did not do so. The court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that the attorney had been retained, but found that Thompson had not shown the required diligence. More than four years passed before he filed an unrepresented petition in the California Supreme Court, and he waited more than a year after Clanton returned part of the fee following complaints about the work.

Actual-Innocence Exception

Thompson argued that the actual-innocence exception allowed the court to consider his late petition. To use that exception, a petitioner must show that, considering all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court considered declarations from Eva Thompson and Eva Barber, who had testified at trial that Thompson said he had shot someone. Their later statements attributed their trial testimony to coercion or said that Thompson did not expressly admit shooting anyone. The state superior court had held an evidentiary hearing and found the recantation evidence not credible. Judge Corley deferred to that credibility finding because state-court factual findings are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The court also found the evidence insufficient even apart from that credibility finding. The witnesses’ recantations came more than 15 years after the conviction and did not explain the delay. Neither witness saw the murder, and their new statements did not undermine other evidence, including testimony about Thompson’s clothing and the destruction and disposal of a gun after the murder. The court also considered evidence that Thompson had possessed a rifle, obtained a gun on the day of the murder, and was taken to the location where the murder occurred. It concluded that the new evidence did not undermine confidence in the conviction.

Disposition

Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley concluded that Thompson had not shown delayed accrual of the limitations period, equitable tolling, or eligibility for the actual-innocence exception. The court held that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations and GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss the habeas petition as untimely. The order disposed of Docket No. 71. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.