Greenlaw v. Su
- Virginia Demarchi
- 5:18-cv-04932
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 14
In Greenlaw v. Micone, Judge Demarchi resolved most trial-evidence motions, granting some, denying others, and deferring several rulings.
Rosemary Greenlaw and Vincent N. Micone, through the evidence and arguments they may present at the trial of Greenlaw’s Rehabilitation Act claim.
What happened
Rosemary Greenlaw v. Vincent N. Micone concerns the sole claim scheduled for trial: whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration violated the Rehabilitation Act by firing Greenlaw because of her disability.
The court excluded Greenlaw’s felony conviction, law degree, disbarment, and certain evidence about other claims and litigation. It allowed questioning about statements she made on federal employment forms, while limiting how that evidence could be used. The court also ruled on late-produced evidence, damages calculations, medical letters, post-termination employment, emails, testimony about her condition, alleged prior discrimination, and emotional-distress damages. Some rulings were granted in part and denied in part, and several issues were deferred until later.
Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi’s February 27, 2025, order resolves most of the parties’ motions in limine, which are requests to limit trial evidence, but leaves some questions for trial or later orders.
The detailed version
- Greenlaw v. Su · No. 5:18-cv-04932
- Virginia Demarchi
- Feb. 27, 2025
Background
The court held a pretrial conference on February 19, 2025. This order resolves most of the parties’ motions in limine—requests to decide before trial what evidence or arguments may be presented—and defers ruling on other issues. The court stated that the sole claim to be tried is whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration violated the Rehabilitation Act by terminating Rosemary Greenlaw’s employment because of her disability.
Greenlaw’s Motions
1. Felony conviction: The court granted Greenlaw’s motion to exclude evidence of her prior felony conviction. Because the conviction was more than 10 years old, its value for evaluating credibility did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. The ruling does not bar questioning about Greenlaw’s statements concerning whether she was on probation.
2. Law degree and disbarment: The court granted the motion. It found that Greenlaw’s law degree was not relevant and that evidence of her disbarment was also irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
3. Other litigation and claims: The court granted the motion to the extent the Secretary sought to use Greenlaw’s other claims or complaints to suggest that she had a general tendency to sue or complain after adverse employment actions. It also granted the motion regarding unsuccessful claims asserted in this action. The ruling does not cover Greenlaw’s testimony or interrogatory answers responding to factual questions, such as why she believes her employment was terminated; the court deferred objections to that evidence until trial. The court also reminded the parties that discovery-rule sanctions may not apply when a failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless.
4. Withdrawn or dismissed claims: The court granted the motion as unopposed because the Secretary confirmed that he did not intend to introduce evidence of claims under Title VII or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that had been withdrawn or dismissed.
5. Union-related activities and claims: The court granted the motion except as stated in the order. The Secretary may not use Greenlaw’s unsuccessful claims or theories to suggest generally that she is not credible or as affirmative evidence that she was not discriminated against because of disability. The ruling does not cover Greenlaw’s factual testimony or interrogatory answers about why she believes she was terminated; the court deferred objections to that evidence until trial.
6. Federal employment declarations: The court denied the motion. If Greenlaw testifies, the Secretary may question her about whether she truthfully answered questions on federal employment forms concerning probation during the previous seven years and being fired during the previous five years. The Secretary may not introduce outside evidence of Greenlaw’s probation status to prove her character for truthfulness. If she denies being on probation, the order permits possible impeachment with her own prior inconsistent statements, and she may explain those statements. The court also allowed Greenlaw to propose a limiting instruction restricting the evidence to evaluating truthfulness or untruthfulness.
The Secretary’s Motions
1. Documents and discovery responses served after the discovery cutoff: The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Greenlaw may offer the photograph identified as Exhibit 85, but not the other dog photograph, because of the late production. The motion was denied as to supplemental interrogatory responses because the Secretary had not identified the supposed new information he wanted excluded. The court deferred ruling on the purported government pay scales identified as Exhibits 87–95 until it considered further submissions due February 28, 2025.
2. Economic-damages calculations: The court granted the motion as unopposed as to damages evidence based on potential Census Bureau salaries. It also granted the motion as unopposed as to damages evidence based on the OSHA Whistleblower position for which Greenlaw was not selected. The court was inclined to permit Greenlaw to testify about wages allegedly lost between her termination and her next employment, based on the pay scales for the OSHA position, but deferred ruling on that issue pending further submissions.
3. Greenlaw’s dog: The court did not resolve this as an evidence issue. It said the dispute concerned the legal framework for Greenlaw’s Rehabilitation Act claim and the parties’ theories of the case, and that it would address that framework when deciding the parties’ proposed jury instructions.
4. Dr. Burak Alsan’s letter: The court denied the motion. Greenlaw may offer the letter for the non-hearsay purpose of showing that she submitted it with her accommodation request and that OSHA reviewed it and acted by granting the request. She may not offer it to prove the truth of the medical diagnosis or conclusion stated in the letter.
5. Dr. Marcie Levine’s letter: The court granted the motion. The letter was hearsay when offered to prove that Greenlaw was disabled, no exception applied, and the letter was not relevant because it post-dated the events at issue and referred to a generic disability rather than Greenlaw’s specific disability.
6. Post-termination federal service: The court denied the motion. Greenlaw may testify about her post-termination employment, including its duties and responsibilities. She may not speculate about why later employers hired her or allowed her to perform particular work. The Secretary may cross-examine her about that employment.
7. Janet Callwood-Jackson’s emails: The court granted the motion as unopposed to the extent it concerned the absence of Callwood-Jackson as a trial witness. The court denied the motion as to the emails themselves, which may be admissible if witnesses who participated in the communications establish a proper foundation.
8. Expert testimony about disability: The court granted the motion to the extent Greenlaw proposed to testify about what doctors told her. She may testify about her own symptoms, impairments, workplace limitations, and understanding of her condition, diagnoses, and treatment, but not about doctors’ statements or doctors’ opinions as hearsay.
9. Mr. Dement’s alleged prior acts of discrimination: The court granted the motion as unopposed because Greenlaw confirmed that she did not intend to introduce prior complaints against Mr. Dement.
10. Emotional distress: The court granted the motion as unopposed because Greenlaw agreed that emotional-distress damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act and said she would not seek them.
Effect of the Order
The order controls or limits many categories of evidence for the upcoming trial, but it does not decide the ultimate disability-discrimination claim. The court deferred some evidentiary questions and said it would issue separate orders concerning proposed jury instructions and other matters from the pretrial conference.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.