Donkor v. Weill Cornell Medical College

Background

Akua Donkor worked as a research technician for Weill Cornell Medical College from February 8, 2021, to February 24, 2022. She alleged that she informed her supervisor that she had attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD, which affected her organizational and executive-function abilities and was associated in her case with dyscalculia and dyslexia. Donkor alleged that she could perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodations.

According to the complaint, Donkor received little guidance from her direct supervisor. After a meeting about scheduling and lunch breaks, Donkor alleged that the supervisor belittled her productivity and ability to perform her duties and rejected her request for more specific guidance. Donkor later met with human-resources personnel, objected that she was not receiving adequate training, and said her supervisor knew about her learning disability. Cornell placed her on a performance improvement plan in November 2021. Donkor alleged that her supervisor continued to provide little guidance while giving more attention and opportunities to coworkers without disabilities. Cornell terminated her employment on February 24, 2022.

Donkor asserted discrimination and retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. Cornell moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

ADA Disability Discrimination

The court explained that an ADA disability-discrimination claim requires a plaintiff to allege, among other things, a qualifying disability and an adverse employment action because of that disability or a perceived disability. The court accepted for purposes of the motion that ADHD is generally an impairment, but said that an impairment qualifies as a disability under the ADA only when it substantially limits one or more major life activities, is supported by a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as such an impairment.

The court held that Donkor did not plausibly allege that her ADHD, dyscalculia, or dyslexia substantially limited a major life activity. Her allegation that ADHD affected her general organizational and executive-function abilities was treated as a legal conclusion without supporting facts. The court also found that her allegations about needing additional guidance, training, and resources described possible accommodations rather than the extent, frequency, duration, or severity of any substantial limitation.

The court separately considered Donkor’s argument that Cornell regarded her as having a disability. Under that theory, the plaintiff need not show that the impairment actually limited a major life activity, but must still plausibly allege that an adverse employment action occurred because of an actual or perceived impairment. The court held that Donkor did not adequately allege that her supervisor knew the extent of her condition or understood how it affected her abilities. It also found that Donkor’s general allegation that coworkers without disabilities received more attention and opportunities did not identify those coworkers or explain whether they were similarly situated.

The court further held that Donkor did not plausibly connect either the alleged failure to provide additional training and resources or her termination to disability-based discrimination. The court said that criticizing work performance, without more facts about the supervisor’s knowledge or perception of Donkor’s condition, did not support a discriminatory motive. It also concluded that Donkor’s allegations about making complaints shortly before termination fit a retaliation theory rather than a disability-discrimination theory. The ADA disability-discrimination claim was dismissed.

ADA Retaliation

To state an ADA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege protected activity, the employer’s awareness of that activity, an adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the action. Although Cornell did not specifically address retaliation in its motion papers, the court found that Donkor had an opportunity to respond because Cornell moved to dismiss the entire case and Donkor addressed retaliation in her opposition.

Donkor argued that her termination was retaliatory because she complained about bias approximately two weeks before she was fired. The court held that her complaint was not specific enough to be reasonably understood as a complaint about disability discrimination. In context, the court viewed her statements about bias as general dissatisfaction with supervision, her requests for guidance, and the treatment she received. The court therefore dismissed the ADA retaliation claim.

State-Law Claims and Leave to Amend

After dismissing the ADA claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the power to hear related state-law claims—over Donkor’s claims under the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court noted that the case was still at an early stage, no discovery had occurred, and declining jurisdiction would avoid unnecessary decisions about state law. Those state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice.

The court granted Donkor leave to file an amended complaint because she might be able to correct the deficiencies through more adequate factual allegations. The court stated that she could replead her state-law claims in an amended complaint and ordered her to file any amended complaint by March 20, 2025.

Disposition

Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted Cornell’s motion to dismiss. Donkor’s ADA discrimination and retaliation claims were dismissed; her state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice; and she was granted leave to amend by March 20, 2025.