MacNeal v. New York City Commission on Human Rights

Background

Kelly MacNeal, representing herself, sued the City of New York, two employees of the New York City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR), and unidentified employees of the New York City Police Department and the New York City Fire Department’s Bureau of Emergency Medical Services. All individual defendants were sued in their official capacities, so the court treated the City as the sole defendant.

MacNeal alleged that smoke entered her apartment, that disability-accessible doors were repeatedly broken, and that her landlord did not adequately respond to her complaints. She said CCHR refused to file a complaint for her after concluding that her status as an affordable or subsidized tenant did not protect her because she was not a racial minority. She also alleged that, after she emailed CCHR and others that she would kill herself if the smoke did not stop, police and emergency medical personnel took her to a hospital for a psychological evaluation over her objection. She claimed that officers handcuffed her, strapped her into a chair, and dragged her from the building.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failing to state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court assumed well-pleaded factual allegations were true and read the self-represented complaint liberally, but did not accept unsupported legal conclusions.

Claims Allowed to Proceed

The court held that MacNeal adequately stated a federal civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a New York City Human Rights Law claim based on CCHR’s alleged refusal to file a complaint concerning discrimination against her as a subsidized tenant. MacNeal alleged that CCHR employees said she could not claim protection based on affordable-tenant status because she was not a minority. The court concluded that these allegations plausibly suggested that CCHR treated her differently because she was Caucasian.

For the federal claim, the court applied the rule that a city can be liable under Section 1983 when an official city policy or established practice causes a constitutional violation. The court found that statements attributed to CCHR attorney Jacqueline Rios and then-Deputy Commissioner Sapna Raj plausibly suggested a CCHR policy or practice of treating subsidized-tenant claimants differently based on whether they belonged to a racial or ethnic minority. The court also found that the allegations plausibly connected that practice to CCHR’s refusal to file a complaint for MacNeal.

The court reached a similar conclusion under the New York City Human Rights Law, finding that the allegations plausibly showed that CCHR denied MacNeal equal treatment because of her race when she sought assistance concerning her subsidized-tenant status.

Claims Dismissed Concerning CCHR’s Other Refusals

The court dismissed the federal and New York City racial-discrimination claims based on CCHR’s refusal to bring disability-discrimination claims concerning the smoke fumes and the broken accessible doors. The court found no sufficient allegation that CCHR refused those claims because of MacNeal’s race. Regarding the smoke-fume claim, CCHR allegedly relied on an unfavorable prior case involving a landlord’s responsibility for a neighbor’s conduct. Regarding the door claim, CCHR allegedly said it did not provide “concierge” service. The court stated that this phrase was not inherently racial and that the complaint did not connect either refusal to a protected status.

The court also dismissed MacNeal’s claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3), and 1986. Section 1981 did not apply because the defendant was a state actor, for which Section 1983 is the available cause of action. The Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim lacked facts showing an agreement among defendants to violate MacNeal’s rights, and the Section 1986 claim failed because it depended on a valid Section 1985 claim.

Claims Concerning the Psychological Evaluation

The court dismissed the false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims under federal and New York law. It held that MacNeal’s email threats provided a reasonable basis to believe she posed a danger to herself, meaning probable cause existed for the psychological evaluation. The court also found that the complaint did not allege a city policy or practice requiring officers to falsely arrest or imprison people reported as suicide risks.

The court dismissed the excessive-force claim under Section 1983 because the complaint did not allege a city policy of using excessive force against people reported to be suicidal. To the extent MacNeal asserted a state-law excessive-force claim, the court found that she did not allege a sufficiently serious or lasting injury.

The court dismissed the Americans with Disabilities Act claim because MacNeal challenged the substance of the services provided during the evaluation, rather than alleging that her disability made it harder for her to obtain services available to similarly situated people without disabilities.

The court dismissed the defamation claims because the alleged report that MacNeal had threatened suicide was not shown to be false or defamatory. Her email stated that she would kill herself, and the court concluded that reporting the threat or forwarding the email was not objectively false.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the alleged conduct did not meet New York’s demanding standard for extreme and outrageous conduct. It dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because the complaint alleged intentional conduct rather than negligence and did not adequately allege a breached duty.

The court dismissed the First Amendment and New York City Human Rights Law retaliation claims. MacNeal alleged that CCHR reported her suicide threat in retaliation for her stated intent to sue. The court found that the immediate suicide threat, rather than the earlier statement about suing, explained the report and broke the alleged causal connection.

The court also dismissed the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because that statute does not independently create a federal cause of action.

Failure to Train and Supervise

The court dismissed the Section 1983 failure-to-train claim because MacNeal alleged only her single encounter with CCHR, police, and emergency medical personnel, not a pattern of similar constitutional violations showing that the City had notice of a training deficiency. The court also dismissed the New York negligent-supervision and retention claim because the complaint did not show that the City or CCHR knew, or reasonably should have known, that the employees had a tendency to engage in the alleged conduct.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to MacNeal’s racial-discrimination claims under Section 1983 and the New York City Human Rights Law concerning CCHR’s refusal to file a complaint alleging discrimination related to her subsidized-tenant status. The court granted the motion otherwise. The Clerk of Court was directed to close the motion.