Melvin v. City of New York

Background

Rodney Melvin filed this pro se lawsuit against the City of New York and Department of Buildings officials Cheryl Leon, Kazimir Vilenchik, Mona Sehgal, Bryan Sanchez, Carolina Marmolejos, and James S. Oddo, as well as John Does 1–10. He asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also asserted state-law claims for negligent hiring and retention, negligence, and failure to intervene, and sought a declaration and permanent injunction against the City.

Melvin applied for a Master Fire Suppression Piping Contractor Class B license on April 9, 2022. The Department of Buildings denied the application on July 20, 2022, stating that he lacked the required design and installation experience. Melvin challenged the decision through reconsideration requests, a records request under New York’s Freedom of Information Law, and a proceeding in New York Supreme Court. The Department later granted the license on August 2, 2023, after determining that Melvin met the minimum experience requirements, which made the state-court proceeding moot.

Melvin also filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights alleging race and age discrimination. The agency found no probable cause on April 26, 2024, and Melvin did not appeal that determination. He then filed this federal action on May 28, 2024. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Equal-Protection Claim

The court held that the New York State Division of Human Rights determination did not prevent Melvin from bringing his equal-protection claim. The agency proceeding did not provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate because there was no indication of discovery, witness interviews, or a hearing, and Melvin apparently represented himself there.

The court nevertheless dismissed the equal-protection claim because the complaint did not plausibly allege selective enforcement based on race or age. Melvin identified six alleged comparators whom he said were younger, non-Black, and less qualified, but the complaint did not provide a basis to infer that Department of Buildings officials knew the applicants’ races. The court also concluded that the information provided did not support an inference that the comparators were significantly younger than Melvin or that any different treatment resulted from an improper motive. The claim was dismissed without prejudice, and Melvin was allowed 30 days to file an amended complaint if he had a good-faith basis to do so.

Procedural-Due-Process Claim

The court dismissed Melvin’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claims. It concluded that the applicable licensing law gave the Department of Buildings commissioner significant discretion to determine whether an applicant met the licensing requirements, so Melvin did not have a constitutionally protected entitlement to the prospective license. The court also held that, even if he had such an interest, the Article 78 proceeding gave him an adequate opportunity to challenge the denial.

Self-Incrimination Claim

The court dismissed Melvin’s Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim. Melvin argued that the licensing process might have required him to disclose that he had engaged in the unlicensed practice of architecture or engineering. But he did not allege that any statements were used against him in a criminal proceeding, which the court held was required for a claim under Section 1983 based on the Self-Incrimination Clause.

First-Amendment Claims

The court dismissed Melvin’s First Amendment claims. It held that alleged violations of New York’s Freedom of Information Law do not, by themselves, establish a federal constitutional violation. It also held that the licensing scheme regulated professional conduct and did not violate the First Amendment merely because Melvin claimed that the denial burdened his professional speech. Finally, the right to petition the government guarantees the ability to communicate with government officials, not a right to receive a response, so the officials’ failure to answer Melvin’s requests for clarification did not state a claim.

Conspiracy and Municipal-Liability Claims

The court dismissed Melvin’s Section 1985 conspiracy claim because he did not plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation. It also dismissed his Section 1983 claims against the City under the municipal-liability principles associated with Monell v. Department of Social Services. Those principles require an underlying constitutional violation and do not impose liability on a city merely because it employs the people alleged to have acted unlawfully.

Equitable and State-Law Claims

The court denied Melvin’s request for a declaratory judgment because it sought a declaration concerning past violations and duplicated the relief available through his other claims. It also denied the request for a permanent injunction because Melvin could not show actual success on the merits after the constitutional claims were dismissed.

After dismissing all claims within its original federal jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Melvin’s state-law claims for negligent hiring and retention, negligence, and failure to intervene. The opinion does not state that those state-law claims were dismissed on their merits.

Disposition

Judge Abrams granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process causes of action were dismissed with prejudice, and leave to amend those claims was denied. The Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim was dismissed without prejudice, with permission to amend within 30 days if Melvin had a good-faith basis. The court denied Melvin’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, and denied as moot his motions to stay proceedings and to lift the discovery stay.