Cintron v. Doe 1

Background

Rafael Cintron, representing himself and proceeding without paying filing fees, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing certain civil-rights claims against state actors. He sued Eric Weshner, identified in the opinion as a detective in the New York City Police Department. Cintron alleged false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution arising from his May 28, 2014 arrest while he was detained on a separate indictment. He alleged that officers threatened to punch him and accused him of forging checks. He was later indicted on forgery charges, which were dismissed on April 13, 2015, after prosecutors concluded they could not prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Cintron filed this action on February 21, 2018, initially naming two unidentified police officers. He later filed an amended complaint naming several defendants. The court dismissed claims against some defendants, and the caption was amended to identify the remaining John Doe defendant as Eric Weshner. Weshner answered and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The court applied the same standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

False-Arrest and Excessive-Force Claims

The court held that both claims accrued on May 28, 2014: the false-arrest claim when Cintron was detained and the excessive-force claim when the alleged force occurred. Section 1983 claims use the state’s personal-injury limitations period; in New York, that period is three years. Because Cintron filed this action on February 21, 2018, the court concluded that the claims were filed after the May 28, 2017 deadline.

Cintron argued that equitable tolling should apply because imprisonment and the related criminal proceedings interfered with his ability to sue. Equitable tolling is a limited extension of a filing deadline for extraordinary circumstances that prevented timely action despite reasonable diligence. The court ruled that incarceration alone, and the circumstances Cintron described, did not meet that standard.

Malicious-Prosecution Claim

The court ruled that the malicious-prosecution claim failed as a matter of law. Under New York law, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the criminal proceeding lacked probable cause. An indictment by a grand jury creates a presumption of probable cause. That presumption can be overcome only with allegations of conduct such as fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence, or other bad-faith police conduct in obtaining the indictment.

Because Cintron’s complaint acknowledged the indictment and alleged no facts showing that it resulted from such misconduct, the court concluded that he did not overcome the presumption of probable cause.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that Weshner’s motion to dismiss Cintron’s amended complaint was granted. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the listed docket item and close the case. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.