DiDonna v. Mass

Background

Louis DiDonna, representing himself and proceeding without paying filing fees, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Robert Maas, Conner Stewart, Douglas Ketcham, Kyle Farrand, and Anthony Skow concerning his March 15, 2021 arrest. On December 23, 2024, the court granted the defendants’ unopposed motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision that resolves claims when the court determines there is no genuine dispute requiring a trial.

DiDonna later filed letters asking the court to reopen the case, accept his late opposition to the summary-judgment motions, or provide materials for an appeal. The court treated the request as a motion for relief from a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The defendants opposed the request. The opinion also notes that Ketcham’s counsel reported Ketcham’s death on January 13, 2025.

Rule 60(b) Standard

Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief from a final order or judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The court explained that a party seeking this extraordinary relief must provide highly convincing evidence, show good cause for not acting sooner, and show that reopening the judgment would not cause undue hardship to other parties. Rule 60(b) cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or simply to relitigate issues.

The court also considered Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief for other extraordinary circumstances not covered by the rule’s specific grounds. The court stated that such circumstances are rare and require evidence of an extreme and undue hardship.

Reasons for the Ruling

DiDonna identified three reasons for missing the December 4, 2024 deadline to oppose summary judgment: an incorrect address on the docket, his arrest and resulting incarceration, and the loss of assistance from the New York Legal Assistance Group.

The court rejected the address explanation because, although the docket briefly showed an incorrect address, the defendants served the motion papers at the correct address, and the court’s order extending the opposition deadline was also mailed to the correct address. The court rejected the incarceration explanation because DiDonna’s arrest occurred three days after the opposition deadline and incarceration did not excuse his failure to meet the deadline or communicate with the court. The court also found that his friend’s attempt to mail the opposition did not excuse the missed deadline.

The court rejected the explanation concerning the New York Legal Assistance Group because DiDonna could have sought procedural assistance from the Pro Se Clerk’s Office and did not request an extension of the December 4 deadline. The court emphasized that people representing themselves must generally comply with understandable procedural rules.

The court further stated that DiDonna’s letters did not present new facts or arguments and did not identify evidence that would create a genuine dispute of material fact. The court summarized the earlier summary-judgment ruling as finding that Ketcham and Stewart lacked the required personal involvement for a § 1983 claim, that the force used to put DiDonna against a car was objectively reasonable, that medical records contradicted his alleged rib injury, and that his claimed handcuffing injury was unsupported by medical records and was minor.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern denied DiDonna’s Rule 60(b) motion. The court did not separately decide the good-cause and undue-hardship parts of the Rule 60(b) analysis because it found that DiDonna had not provided highly convincing evidence warranting relief. As to DiDonna’s request for an appeal packet, the court stated that one had already been mailed with the Clerk’s Judgment and directed the Clerk’s Office to mail another copy of the judgment and attachments to him. The opinion does not state that the Rule 60(b) motion was denied with or without prejudice.