Gunn v. "Bill"

Background

Darrell Gunn brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows people to seek remedies for constitutional violations by state officials. He alleged that employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision violated the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs and by using excessive force.

Gunn alleged that he was on a hunger strike from June 1 through June 5, 2017, while temporarily housed at Downstate Correctional Facility. After he fell while being taken for transport, he alleged that Sergeant Stephan Petrie and other correction officers dragged him in a stairwell. Petrie denied those allegations. Gunn was then examined by Nurse Donna Collins at Downstate and later by Nurse Dave Lindemann and Nurse Carrie Soltish at Green Haven Correctional Facility. The record described bruises, scratches, cuts, and wrist swelling. Gunn also alleged that Lindemann and Correction Officer Finn grabbed his hands and that Lindemann grabbed him by the throat or neck at the Green Haven clinic.

The case also included claims against Sergeants D. Mazzella and D. Malark. Gunn alleged that Mazzella failed to arrange hospital care and that Malark failed to provide a doctor. Before this motion, Esposito had been terminated from the case, and Gunn had consented to dismissal of Kendre Lyons because she was not implicated in the events and had been served by mistake.

Motion and standard

Defendants Finn, Lindemann, Malark, Mazzella, Petrie, Roser, and Soltish moved for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but that party must present evidence beyond speculation.

The motion sought judgment on the deliberate-indifference claims against Collins, Lindemann, Soltish, Malark, and Mazzella, and on the excessive-force claims against Lindemann, Finn, and Roser. The motion did not seek judgment on Gunn’s excessive-force claim against Petrie. The court treated Gunn’s statement of disputed facts and his filing titled “Motion to Strike Partial Summary Judgment” as his opposition to the motion.

Deliberate indifference to medical needs

To prove deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a prisoner must show both that the medical problem or deprivation was sufficiently serious and that the defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

The court granted summary judgment on Gunn’s claim against Collins. Collins examined Gunn, took his vital signs, and offered food and water. The court concluded that the bruises, cuts, wrist swelling, and general complaint of pain shown in the record were not sufficiently serious, and that the record did not show Collins acted with deliberate indifference. Collins had not been served, but the court considered the claim and dismissed it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The court also granted summary judgment on the claims against Lindemann and Soltish. Lindemann documented Gunn’s complaints and concluded that first aid was unnecessary. Soltish examined Gunn, recorded superficial cuts, bruises, and scratches, and likewise concluded that first aid was unnecessary. The court held that the injuries were not sufficiently serious and that the evidence did not show either nurse knew of and disregarded a serious medical need.

The court granted summary judgment on the claim against Mazzella because the record did not show his personal involvement. Gunn did not communicate directly with Mazzella about the sick-call letter, and Mazzella denied receiving it. The court concluded that Gunn’s speculation that the letter had been delivered to Mazzella was insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute.

The court granted summary judgment on the claim against Malark because Malark ordered that Gunn be examined by clinic staff, directed staff to take photographs, and directed them to complete an injury report. The court rejected Gunn’s contention that he was entitled to be examined by a doctor rather than a nurse, and found no evidence that Malark acted with the required culpable state of mind.

Excessive force

An Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim requires proof that the force was serious enough to have constitutional significance and that the official used it maliciously or sadistically to cause harm rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.

The court granted summary judgment on Gunn’s claim against Lindemann based on the alleged throat or neck grab. Even accepting Gunn’s account, the court found that Gunn had not provided enough detail about the duration or amount of force, and that the alleged grab was not sufficiently serious. The court also found no evidence that Lindemann acted maliciously or sadistically; the parties agreed that Lindemann grabbed Gunn to keep him from falling.

The court granted summary judgment on the claim that Lindemann and Finn grabbed Gunn’s hands. Gunn did not identify any such use of force in his deposition, and the court found no other record evidence supporting the allegation. The court also granted summary judgment to Roser because the record did not show that he was personally involved in the alleged force by Lindemann or Finn. Gunn alleged only that Roser yelled at him, and the court stated that verbal abuse alone did not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted Defendants’ partial motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Gunn’s deliberate-indifference claims against Collins, Lindemann, Soltish, Malark, and Mazzella, and his excessive-force claims against Lindemann, Finn, and Roser. The court directed the Clerk to terminate those seven defendants and the pending motions. Gunn’s excessive-force claim against Petrie was the sole remaining claim and was set to proceed to trial. The court did not decide whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it resolved the claims on other grounds.