O'Rear v. Diaz
- Paul Engelmayer
- 1:24-cv-01669
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 11
O’Rear v. Diaz: Judge Engelmayer denied O’Rear’s request to amend, so her federal workplace claim remains pending.
S. O’Rear, Armando Diaz, Merkley + Partners Inc., Omnicom Group Inc., and the other parties to the case. O’Rear could not remove the Title VII claim through the proposed amendment, and the previously undismissed claims remain pending in federal court.
What happened
In O’Rear v. Diaz, S. O’Rear asked to amend her complaint to remove her only federal claim, a workplace sexual-harassment claim against the corporate defendants under Title VII. She believed removing it would end federal jurisdiction and allow her to pursue her remaining state-law claims in state court.
The court rejected that argument, explaining that the cited Supreme Court decision involved a timely amendment, while O’Rear waited until nearly the end of fact discovery and after several rulings in the case. The court found undue delay and bad faith under the amendment rules and found no good cause to change the scheduling order.
Judge Paul A. Engelmayer denied the motion for leave to amend. The Title VII claim and all other claims not previously dismissed remain pending, and the court said it would address summary-judgment motions after fact discovery.
The detailed version
- O'Rear v. Diaz · No. 1:24-cv-01669
- Paul Engelmayer
- Mar. 14, 2025
Background
S. O’Rear sued Armando Diaz, Merkley + Partners Inc., Omnicom Group Inc., and other defendants. The opinion states that O’Rear alleged Diaz sexually assaulted and raped her after an offsite holiday gathering in December 2022. O’Rear brought claims concerning that alleged conduct against Diaz and the corporate defendants under state law. She also brought workplace sexual-harassment claims against all defendants under the New York City Human Rights Law and against the corporate defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Title VII claim was the case’s only federal claim and the sole stated basis for federal jurisdiction. In January 2025, the court dismissed the three claims against the corporate defendants arising from the alleged assault and rape and denied Diaz’s motion to dismiss in full. The Title VII and New York City Human Rights Law sexual-harassment claims against the corporate defendants remained. Fact discovery had been ongoing for about 10 months and was scheduled to close on March 24, 2025.
On March 5, 2025, O’Rear moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) for permission to file a second amended complaint removing the Title VII claim. O’Rear argued that removing the federal claim would eliminate federal jurisdiction, require dismissal without prejudice of the remaining state-law claims, and permit her to bring those claims in state court. She relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger. O’Rear also stated that information learned in discovery and the court’s prior rulings had led her to believe that the Title VII claim was not viable and would be dismissed on summary judgment.
The defendants opposed the motion. They argued that Royal Canin involved a timely amendment after a state-court case had been removed to federal court, unlike O’Rear’s late request in a case filed in federal court. They also argued that the proposed amendment would cause delay and prejudice and reflected forum shopping.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that O’Rear’s reading of Royal Canin was mistaken. In that case, the plaintiff timely amended her complaint to remove the federal allegations that supported removal, after which the Supreme Court held that federal-question jurisdiction and related supplemental jurisdiction were lost. Here, by contrast, O’Rear sought to amend nearly 11 months after her prior amendment, after multiple amendment deadlines had passed, after extensive motion practice, and just before the close of fact discovery.
The court applied Rule 15(a), which generally favors amendment when justice requires, but permits denial for reasons including undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility. It also applied Rule 16(b), which requires good cause to modify a scheduling order. The court explained that good cause depends on the moving party’s diligence.
The court found that O’Rear’s motion satisfied neither standard. It concluded that allowing the amendment would disrupt the case-management plan, delay the litigation, and reward what the court characterized as forum shopping and gamesmanship. Under Rule 15(a), the court denied the motion based, among other reasons, on undue delay and bad faith. Under Rule 16(b), it denied the motion for lack of good cause.
The court did not dismiss the Title VII claim in this opinion. It expressly stated that all claims not previously dismissed, including that claim, remained pending. The court directed the parties to proceed toward summary-judgment proceedings after fact discovery. It further stated that, if no federal claim survived summary judgment, the parties could then litigate whether the court should retain the remaining state-law claims under the ordinary standards governing supplemental jurisdiction, rather than under Royal Canin.
Disposition
Judge Paul A. Engelmayer denied O’Rear’s motion for leave to amend as improper under Rules 15(a) and 16(b). The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion at Docket 125. The opinion leaves the previously undismissed claims pending.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.