Bordes, Jr. v. Deveaux

Background

Peter Bordes, Jr. brought four counts against Marc Deveaux based on three comments Deveaux allegedly posted on LinkedIn on August 20, 2023. Counts I and II asserted defamation per se and defamation. Count III asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count IV was styled as a separate claim for a permanent injunction.

Judge Jennifer E. Willis, the magistrate judge handling pretrial proceedings and dispositive motions, recommended granting Deveaux’s motion for summary judgment on all of Bordes’s claims and denying Bordes’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the defamation-per-se claim. No party filed objections, so the parties waived their right to object to the recommendation or obtain appellate review. Despite that waiver, the district court stated that it reviewed the recommendation anew.

Court’s Analysis

The court adopted the recommendation that Counts I and II be dismissed. It agreed that the comment stating that Bordes was being sued for “Wage Theft” was substantially true because Deveaux had filed a pending lawsuit against Bordes. It also agreed that the comment stating that Bordes’s company had been reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission for accounting fraud was substantially true because Deveaux had filed a complaint with that agency concerning a company for which Bordes serves on the board. The court further agreed that the comment calling Bordes “Peter Doo-Doo head” and stating that he knew nothing about artificial intelligence was a non-actionable opinion.

The court also adopted the recommendation that Count III be dismissed. Considering the three statements both separately and together, it concluded that the conduct did not constitute “extreme and outrageous conduct,” which is required for an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The court did not reach the alternative grounds that the “serious crime” theory might not apply to the Wage Theft Comment or that the emotional-distress claim was duplicative of the defamation claims.

The court explained that an injunction is a remedy rather than an independent cause of action. Because Bordes’s substantive claims were dismissed, the court concluded that he was not entitled to independent injunctive relief. It therefore denied the request for injunctive relief and dismissed Count IV to the extent it was pleaded as a separate cause of action.

Disposition

Judge John P. Cronan granted Deveaux’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety and denied Bordes’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment. Counts I, II, and III were dismissed. Bordes’s request for injunctive relief was denied, and Count IV was dismissed to the extent it was pleaded as a separate cause of action. The court directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for Deveaux and close the case. It also certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status for that purpose.