Bordes, Jr. v. Deveaux
- John Cronan
- 1:23-cv-07430
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 29
In Bordes, Jr. v. Deveaux, Judge Willis recommended granting Deveaux’s summary-judgment motion and denying Bordes’s motion over three LinkedIn comments.
Peter Bordes, Jr.’s libel per quod, libel per se, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against Marc Deveaux; the recommendation favored Deveaux on all claims, subject to review by Judge Cronan.
What happened
In Bordes, Jr. v. Deveaux, Peter Bordes, Jr. sued Marc Deveaux over three LinkedIn comments accusing Bordes of wage theft, linking his company to an accounting-fraud report, and insulting his knowledge of artificial intelligence. Bordes claimed libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Deveaux asked for summary judgment on all claims, while Bordes sought summary judgment on his libel claims. The court concluded that the wage-theft and accounting-fraud comments were substantially true, and that the artificial-intelligence comment was an opinion rather than a provably false fact. It also concluded that none of the comments was extreme and outrageous enough to support an emotional-distress claim.
Magistrate Judge Willis recommended granting Deveaux’s summary-judgment motion and denying Bordes’s motion. The recommendation would dismiss the claims concerning all three comments, subject to the parties’ opportunity to object to the recommendation before Judge Cronan.
The detailed version
- Bordes, Jr. v. Deveaux · No. 1:23-cv-07430
- John Cronan
- Feb. 26, 2025
Background
Peter Bordes, Jr. sued Marc Deveaux under New York law for libel per quod, libel per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims arose from three comments Deveaux posted on LinkedIn on August 20, 2023: “Peter Bordes is currently being sued for Wage Theft”; “Peter Bordes’ company reported to SEC for Accounting Fraud”; and “Peter Doo-Doo head, know shit about AI.” Bordes alleged that the comments harmed his reputation and caused stress, anxiety, and sleeplessness.
Deveaux moved for summary judgment on all of Bordes’s claims. Bordes filed a partial summary-judgment motion seeking judgment on his libel per se claims. The court applied New York law because the parties agreed it governed and because the relevant choice-of-law rules pointed to New York law.
Court’s Analysis
The court analyzed each comment separately.
For the “Wage Theft” comment, the court held that the statement was substantially true because Deveaux had filed a pending lawsuit against Bordes concerning unpaid wages under New Jersey’s Wage Payment Law. Under New York law, substantial truth is a complete defense to defamation. The court also rejected Bordes’s argument that the statement qualified as libel per se because it accused him of a serious crime, explaining that New York’s recognized libel per se categories do not include that category. The court further concluded that the comment did not constitute the extreme and outrageous conduct required for an intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
For the “Accounting Fraud” comment, the court held that the statement was substantially true because Deveaux had submitted a complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission alleging accounting problems at Fernhill, and Bordes was a Fernhill board member. The court concluded that the comment was close enough to the underlying facts that it caused no legally actionable harm. It also concluded that the comment was not extreme and outrageous enough to support an emotional-distress claim.
For the artificial-intelligence comment, the court held that the statement was non-actionable opinion. The wording had no precise, readily understood meaning, and its angry tone, grammatical errors, and juvenile insult would lead a reasonable LinkedIn reader to view it as an opinion rather than a factual assertion. The court also concluded that the comment did not meet the extreme-and-outrageous standard for an emotional-distress claim.
The court additionally stated that Bordes’s emotional-distress claims were duplicative because they relied on the same underlying facts as his libel claims. Under New York law, an emotional-distress claim generally cannot proceed when it duplicates a defamation claim.
Recommendation and Disposition
Magistrate Judge Jennifer E. Willis recommended that Deveaux’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and that Bordes’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED. For each of the three comments, the recommendation granted summary judgment to Deveaux on the libel per quod claim and dismissed it, granted summary judgment to Deveaux on the libel per se claim, and denied Bordes’s motion on the libel per se claim. For each comment, the recommendation also granted summary judgment to Deveaux on the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim and dismissed it.
This was a report and recommendation rather than the final ruling by the assigned district judge. The parties had fourteen days after service to file written objections with Judge John P. Cronan. The recommendation stated that failing to object within that period would waive objections and preclude appellate review.
Read the full 29-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.