Sage v. County of Monterey

Background

Shasha Sage alleged that she was a registered member of the One Starfish Safe Parking Program and was allowed to keep her recreational vehicle in a designated parking space overnight and permanently. She alleged that she had used the same space for two and a half years before the Monterey County Sheriff’s Department evicted her on November 12, 2021.

Claim XI of Sage’s First Amended Complaint asserted wrongful eviction under three theories: California common law, California Civil Code section 1946, and California Code of Civil Procedure section 1159. The County moved under Rule 12(c), which allows a party to seek judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. The court applied the same standard used for a motion to dismiss, accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true for purposes of the motion. No opposition to the County’s motion was filed.

Court’s Analysis

California common law. California common-law wrongful eviction requires peaceable possession of real property and damages caused by the forcible entry of someone claiming to be the lawful owner or possessor. The court held that Sage could not base this theory on her eviction from the recreational vehicle because the vehicle was not real property.

The court also considered whether Sage had peaceable possession of the parking space. Sage alleged that she was told she could keep her vehicle there permanently, that she used the space for two and a half years, and that she performed upkeep and other tasks at the parking lot. The court recognized that services can sometimes provide consideration for a leasehold interest, but held that the services must have been bargained for in exchange for the promised property interest. Because Sage did not allege that she paid rent or that her services were promised in exchange for a leasehold, the court held that she had not adequately alleged a leasehold interest in the parking space.

California Civil Code section 1946. Section 1946 generally requires 30 days’ written notice to end a tenancy when a person hires real property for a term not specified by the parties. The court agreed with the County that the ordinary meaning of “hire” includes payment. Because Sage did not allege that she paid for the parking space or exchanged services for a property interest in it, the court held that she did not adequately state a claim under section 1946.

California Code of Civil Procedure section 1159. Section 1159 addresses forcible entry and the forcible removal of a person in possession of real property. The court held that Sage had not alleged specific facts showing that she reached an agreement with One Starfish giving her a property interest in the parking space. It also held that the recreational vehicle was not real property covered by section 1159. The court therefore granted judgment on the pleadings on this theory as well.

Disposition

The court GRANTED the County’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Claim XI, including Sage’s California common-law wrongful-eviction theory, section 1946 theory, and section 1159 theory. The order does not state that the ruling was with or without prejudice.