Sage v. County of Monterey

Background

Shasha Sage alleged that she was a registered member of the Starfish Safe Parking Program and had permission to park her recreational vehicle in a parking lot in Marina, California, including overnight. She alleged that on November 12, 2021, the Monterey County Sheriff’s Department arrested her and that she was unlawfully evicted, denied access to her recreational vehicle, and deprived of her trailer and personal property.

The complaint asserted 11 causes of action against the County of Monterey and officers involved in her arrest. The only claim against One Starfish, Inc. was the final cause of action, which alleged wrongful eviction under common law and several California statutes. Starfish moved to dismiss that claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legally recognized claim.

Motion to Strike

Sage attached a declaration and two exhibits to her opposition. The court granted Starfish’s motion to strike because a court generally cannot consider material outside the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court nevertheless considered the material for the limited purpose of deciding whether Sage should receive permission to amend her complaint.

Common-Law Wrongful Eviction

The court rejected Starfish’s argument that California common law does not recognize a wrongful-eviction claim. But it held that Sage had not pleaded facts showing that she was in peaceful possession of real property and that Starfish forcibly entered it. Her recreational vehicle was not real property. Her allegation that she had “parking rights” also did not establish a lease or exclusive possession of the land.

The court dismissed the common-law wrongful-eviction theory with leave to amend. It stated that Sage might be able to allege additional facts showing a tenancy, even if she did not pay rent, and could also plead a breach-of-contract theory if supported by sufficient facts.

Recreational Vehicle Park Occupancy Law

The court held that California’s Recreational Vehicle Park Occupancy Law applies to a recreational vehicle park where lots are rented, leased, or held out for rent or lease. Sage did not allege facts showing that the parking lot met that definition. She alleged only that she and other participants had parking rights, not that they paid rent or were subject to lease agreements.

The court granted Starfish’s motion to dismiss the theory under that law and dismissed it without leave to amend because it found amendment would be futile.

California Civil Code Sections 1946 and 1946.2

The parties agreed that section 1946.2, which concerns dwelling units, did not apply. The court therefore dismissed Sage’s section 1946.2 theory without leave to amend.

The court rejected Starfish’s argument that section 1946 applies only to dwelling units. However, it held that Sage had not alleged facts showing she was a person who “hired” real property. The court explained that the ordinary meaning of hiring property includes payment or other compensation, and Sage had not alleged that she paid rent or provided compensation for the parking space. Because she might be able to plead facts showing that she was a hirer of real property, the court dismissed the section 1946 theory with leave to amend.

California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1162 and 1159

The court dismissed the section 1162 theory without leave to amend. Section 1162 concerns notice required to begin certain unlawful-detainer proceedings; the court explained that it does not create an affirmative claim for damages or other relief based on deficient notice. The court stated that the forcible-entry and forcible-detainer statutes, including section 1159, provide the relevant cause of action for a tenant seeking a remedy for a wrongful eviction.

As to section 1159, the court held that although a recreational vehicle is not real property, the land underneath it is real property and could potentially support a forcible-entry claim. Sage nevertheless had not alleged enough facts showing that she was a hirer of the land or otherwise had rights to it. Because her allegations about an oral agreement and long-term possession might support an amended claim, the court dismissed the forcible-entry theory with leave to amend.

Order

The court granted One Starfish, Inc.’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the common-law wrongful-eviction, section 1946, and forcible-entry theories with leave to amend, and dismissed the Recreational Vehicle Park Occupancy Law, section 1946.2, and section 1162 theories without leave to amend. Sage could file an amended complaint within 30 days of the order, subject to a reasonable extension by motion or stipulation. Judge Beth Labson Freeman also encouraged Sage to contact the Federal Pro Se Program for assistance.