Fernandez v. Katie May, LLC

Background

Jacqueline Fernandez, who is legally blind and uses screen-reading software, alleged that she visited Katie May, LLC's website multiple times to buy a dress. She claimed that obstructed search suggestions, incomplete image descriptions, unclear labels for interactive elements, and other barriers prevented her from completing the transaction. She alleged that these problems denied her a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person.

Fernandez sued under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the New York City Human Rights Law. She sought injunctive and declaratory relief under both laws and damages under the city law. Katie May moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6), arguing that Fernandez lacked standing, that the court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the company, and that she failed to state a claim.

Standing

The court held that Fernandez adequately pleaded standing to seek injunctive relief. A plaintiff seeking an injunction in an accessibility case must allege a past injury, facts supporting a reasonable inference that the discrimination will continue, and specific facts supporting an inference that the plaintiff is likely to return.

The court found the first two requirements satisfied because Fernandez alleged that she tried to use the website but could not do so and encountered the barriers multiple times. Her allegations also stated that Katie May lacked a policy reasonably calculated to make the website accessible and keep it accessible. The court found the third requirement satisfied because Fernandez identified the specific dress she wanted, explained why she wanted it, identified a date when she tried to access the website, and alleged multiple other attempts. The court concluded that these facts supported an inference that she would return if the barriers were removed.

Personal Jurisdiction

The court held that Katie May was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York. Under New York's long-arm statute, jurisdiction may exist when a defendant conducts business in New York and the claim is substantially related to that business.

Fernandez alleged that Katie May shipped online orders to New York customers and that she attempted to complete a transaction from her New York home. Because her claim arose directly from her inability to complete that transaction, the court found the statutory requirement satisfied. The court also held that exercising jurisdiction complied with constitutional due-process requirements because shipping products to New York, even in a small number of transactions, showed that Katie May purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in the state. The court said the company's lack of New York offices, employees, and bank accounts did not change that conclusion.

Failure to State a Claim

The court held that the amended complaint plausibly stated claims for relief. On a motion to dismiss, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and does not consider outside evidence to resolve factual disputes. Accordingly, the court gave no weight at this stage to a declaration from Katie May's chief operating officer stating that he had not encountered accessibility problems when using the website. The court instead accepted Fernandez's allegations that she encountered multiple barriers.

The court rejected Katie May's argument that Fernandez had to notify the company of her disability before filing suit. The court explained that prior notice is assumed for some claims based on failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, but that disability-discrimination claims may also proceed under intentional-discrimination or disparate-impact theories. Fernandez argued, and the court found, that she had adequately alleged a disparate-impact theory: seemingly neutral website design practices allegedly produced significantly adverse effects for blind customers. Because the complaint adequately stated that theory, the court rejected the notice argument.

The court also held that a website can qualify as a place of public accommodation under Title III even when it is not connected to a physical storefront. The court relied on the statute's inclusion of clothing stores and other sales or rental establishments, as well as precedent indicating that Title III is not limited to physical access to buildings. The court concluded that Katie May provided a public accommodation through its online sales business and that Fernandez adequately alleged that she was denied full and equal enjoyment of its services.

Disposition

The court denied Katie May's motion to dismiss. The opinion did not resolve ultimate liability; it allowed Fernandez's claims to proceed at this stage. The court also ordered the parties to appear for an initial pretrial conference on April 4, 2025, and required them to file a joint letter and proposed case-management materials by March 27, 2025.